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Abstract 
 
Essays on the Effects of the Voter Initiative in U.S. States 
 
Gregory M. Randolph 
 
 
This dissertation is a collection of papers that examines the effects of the voter initiative in U.S. 
states.  Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the voter initiative process and outlines the 
research agenda for this dissertation.  Chapter 2 explores the history of the voter initiative in U.S. 
states and examines the differences in the voter initiative process between states in the U.S.  
Additionally, this chapter provides a general survey of the literature regarding the effects of the 
voter initiative on political and economic outcomes.  Chapter 3 examines the interest group 
orientation of total state spending in U.S. states.  A measure for the publicness of state spending 
is calculated in order to examine the interest group influence on state spending in both voter 
initiative and non-initiative states.  The results show that the voter initiative process does not 
decrease the interest group orientation of state expenditures.  Chapter 4 investigates the impact of 
the voter initiative on total per capita state election cycle spending in state gubernatorial and state 
legislative elections.  The results indicate that the availability of the voter initiative decreases the 
value of both state legislative and state gubernatorial offices.  The impact of the voter initiative 
appears to have a larger negative effect on the value of state legislative offices in comparison to 
state gubernatorial offices.  Chapter 5 empirically analyzes the impact of the voter initiative on 
the production of legislation in U.S. states.  The amount of legislation enacted by state legislators 
is estimated in order to examine the effects of the voter initiative.  This chapter also explores the 
impact of the voter initiative on the number of special sessions called in U.S. states.  Finally, the 
effect of the voter initiative on the usage of the governor’s veto in U.S. states is examined.  The 
results indicate that voter initiative states enact more legislation, call a greater number of special 
sessions, and have less gubernatorial vetoes than non-initiative states.  Chapter 6 summarizes the 
major findings in the dissertation, discusses the policy implications, and suggests future areas of 
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The Effects of the Voter Initiative in U.S. States 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The voter initiative is a form of direct democracy that allows groups and individual voters to 
propose statutes or constitutional amendments.  In states where the voter initiative is available, 
individuals can place laws or amendments on the ballot, allowing voters to directly decide the 
outcome.  In order to place a voter initiative on the ballot, a certain number of signatures must be 
collected to provide evidence of sufficient support for the measure.  The signature requirement 
varies across states in which the voter initiative is available.  Once the signature requirement is 
met, the policy proposal will appear on the ballot.  The proposal is adopted if a majority of voters 
vote in favor of the proposal. 
 The resurgence of the voter initiative in the late 1970’s and its continuously increasing 
usage has attracted scholarly attention in recent years.  The primary question surrounding the 
voter initiative involves identifying the true beneficiaries of the voter initiative process.  
Opponents of the voter initiative believe that the voter initiative process is subverted by narrow 
special interest groups.  They cite the massive amounts of money that are involved in voter 
initiatives as evidence.  These opponents claim that special interest groups can motivate 
supporters while ordinary voters have little incentive to vote.  They allege that individuals lack 
knowledge of the issues and can be lead astray by special interest groups.  Additionally, they 
argue that the behavior of the legislature can be distorted by the threat of a voter initiative.  Due 
to the aforementioned reasons, opponents of the voter initiative claim that the voter initiative 
harms the median voter.  Conversely, proponents of the voter initiative process assert that the 
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voter initiative process gives the general public a method by which they can directly affect 
policies that may otherwise cater to special interests.  Additionally, proponents claim that the 
threat of a voter initiative may cause the legislature to enact legislation that is better aligned with 
the preferences of the median voter (Matsusaka, 2005a). 
 While the majority of the voter initiative research is concentrated in attempting to 
determine the primary beneficiaries of the process, other recent research has attempted to 
examine the impact of the voter initiative on numerous other areas.  The issue of voter 
competence and the role of money in the voter initiative process have received a great deal of 
attention in recent years.  Other recent research has focused on the effects of the voter initiative 
on the political process and policy outcomes. 
 
1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda 
Chapter 2 chronicles the history of the voter initiative in U.S. states, examines differences in the 
voter initiative process between states, explores the usage of the voter initiative, and reviews the 
important existing voter initiative literature.  While the usage of the voter initiative is often 
viewed as a recent phenomenon, the voter initiative was first introduced at the state level in 
South Dakota in 1898.  The majority of states with the voter initiative adopted the process in the 
following twenty years.  Currently, 24 states have some form of the voter initiative.  However, 
the there are several important differences among the voter initiative states that have a significant 
impact on the usage of the voter initiative.   
 As mentioned previously, interest in the effects of the voter initiative has increased 
dramatically in the past few decades as use of the voter initiative has grown rapidly.  While there 
are many areas left unexplored, scholars have focused their attention on several key issues.  The 
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investigation into the theory behind the voter initiative involves examining agency problems, the 
unbundling of logrolling, and the quality of information.  The issues of voter competence, the 
role of money in the voter initiative process, and the possible tyranny of the majority are often 
evaluated as well.  Finally, some of the most crucial research focuses on the effects of the voter 
initiative on policy outcomes and the performance of government. 
 One of the most important and heavily debated issues involving the voter initiative is the 
determination of the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative process.  While subjective 
observations have been the basis of the argument in the past, recent empirical observations have 
suggested that the median voter is the primary beneficiary.  The most compelling evidence is 
provided by Matsusaka (2004), who examines state and local spending and taxation throughout 
the twenty-first century.  He finds that states in which the voter initiative is available tend to have 
lower taxes and spending levels, rely more on user fees as opposed to general taxes, and spend 
more at the local government level and less at the state government level in comparison to states 
in which the voter initiative process is unavailable.  Additionally, he examines opinion surveys 
and finds that a large majority of U.S. citizens support these causes.  Evidence also suggests that 
policies that are enacted in voter initiative states are favored by the median voter.  Gerber (1999) 
finds that the death penalty and parental notification of abortions in minors are more prevalent in 
voter initiative states in comparison to states that lack the voter initiative process.  These issues 
are largely preferred by the majority in opinion surveys.  Matsusaka (2004) also finds that voter 
initiative states are more likely to have term limits for legislators, which is also supported by a 
majority of voters in opinion surveys. 
 However, the issue of the influence of special interest groups over the voter initiative 
process remains at the center of the voter initiative debate.  In order to examine this issue, 
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Chapter 3 investigates the interest group influence on total state government expenditures.  State 
expenditures that are allocated due to special interest influence are a private good because the 
benefits accrue directly to members of the interest group.  For example, more money must be 
allocated in order to provide an additional farm subsidy in a state.  In contrast, public goods are 
non-rival in consumption and non-excludable.  For instance, an additional individual can share in 
the use of an uncongested rural highway at virtually no additional cost.  While we would expect 
a significant amount of total state government expenditures to be a private good, we do expect 
some degree of public expenditures as well.  This chapter examines the publicness of total state 
spending and compares states in which the voter initiative process is available and states that 
lack the voter initiative process.  Because interest group influenced spending is a private good, a 
greater level of private spending would suggest a higher interest group influence on total state 
government spending. 
 Following the examples of Deno and Mehay (1987), Holcombe and Sobel (1995), and 
King (2006), this chapter employs the empirical median voter model to estimate the ‘publicness’ 
of total state spending.  The model estimates the demand for total state spending.  An estimate of 
the degree to which total state government spending is a private good (on a scale of 0% to 100%) 
is obtained and the results for voter initiative states and states in which the voter initiative 
process is unavailable are compared.  The results suggest that total state government spending is 
not significantly more public in voter initiative states.  At the very least, we are able to reject the 
notion that special interest groups exert less influence over total state spending in voter initiative 
states.  Boehmke (2002, 2005) provides a plausible explanation for this finding.  He finds that 
states that have the initiative process available have a higher number of interest groups in 
comparison to states that lack the voter initiative process.   
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 While much of the voter initiative literature focuses on whether the voter initiative shifts 
power toward special interest groups or the median voter, the relative power shift between the 
legislature, the executive branch, and the median voter receives little attention.  When the voter 
initiative is unavailable, the legislature has monopoly control over law making.  However, when 
the voter initiative is available, the median voter and the governor play a much larger role in the 
process. 
 Matsusaka (2005c) examines the issue of the relative shift in power when the voter 
initiative process is available.  From the governor’s perspective, the availability of the voter 
initiative can be helpful or harmful depending on the preferences of the median voter on a given 
issue.  If the preferences of the median voter are closer to the preferences of the governor than 
the preferences of the legislature, the voter initiative can serve as a useful policy tool for the 
governor.  The governor can support a voter initiative and change policy through the passage of a 
voter initiative (the direct effect of the voter initiative) or proactive legislative activity (the 
indirect effect of the voter initiative).  However, if the preferences of the median voter are more 
closely aligned with the preferences of the legislature than the preferences of the governor, the 
voter initiative process may take power away from the governor.  A voter initiative may result in 
a policy that is less favorable to the governor.  Therefore we can conclude that the effect of the 
voter initiative on the power of the governor is ambiguous in theory.  However, the voter 
initiative appears to decrease the power of the legislature under all circumstances in theory.  
Finally, the voter initiative can benefit the median voter and should not harm the median voter 
under any conditions at the very least. 
 In order to examine these theories, Chapter 4 estimates the value of both state legislative 
and state gubernatorial office seats.  Because candidates and their donors are well aware of the 
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resources that they will potentially control and the decision-making power that they will have, 
we can expect that candidates and donors will spend an amount comparable to the value of the 
resources and power in order to obtain control of them.  After controlling for other factors, this 
chapter examines the effect of the voter initiative on the value of office. 
 Total per capita election cycle spending for all state legislative open seats is estimated for 
the year 2000 following an empirical specification by Hogan (1999, 2000).  The estimates show 
that the availability of the voter initiative process significantly decreases campaign spending in 
state legislative elections.  Following Lott (2000), total per capita spending in state gubernatorial 
election cycle campaigns is estimated for all state gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 2002.  
The results suggest that the voter initiative also has a significantly negative effect on 
gubernatorial campaign spending as well.  Finally, the average percentage decrease in campaign 
spending due to the voter initiative process is calculated for both state legislative and 
gubernatorial elections.  The voter initiative process appears to cause a larger percentage 
decrease in spending in state legislative campaigns when compared to state gubernatorial 
campaigns.   
 Chapter 5 examines the effect of the voter initiative on legislative production.  There are 
two avenues by which the voter initiative can help shape policy outcomes.  The first means of 
influencing policy occurs through the passage of a voter initiative that is placed on the ballot and 
approved by the voters.  This is known as the direct effect of the voter initiative.  The voter 
initiative can also cause the legislature to proactively enact legislation in order to avoid the 
passage of a voter initiative that the legislature views as unfavorable.  While the voter initiative 
literature tends to focus on the direct effect, scholars often believe that the indirect effect of the 
voter initiative may be of equal or greater importance. 
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 Gerber (1996) and Gerber and Hug (2001) provide the theory behind the indirect effect of 
the voter initiative.  While the passage of voter initiatives on the ballot are relatively easy to 
measure, the indirect effect of the voter initiative is much more difficult to capture.  The indirect 
effects of the voter initiative are simply categorized as legislation and it is difficult to separate 
the indirect effects from other legislation.  In order to examine this aspect of the voter initiative, 
this chapter employs an empirical specification following Rogers (2005).  The number of bills 
enacted during the regular legislative session by states from 1981 - 2001 (every other year due to 
the available data in the Book of the States) is estimated.  The results suggest that the legislature 
enacts more legislation in states where the voter initiative is available, implying that the indirect 
effect of the voter initiative does have a significant impact on legislative behavior. 
 The number of special sessions called by U.S. states from 1981 – 2001 is also examined 
in this chapter.  States can call special sessions in order to deal with a number of important 
issues.  An estimation of the number of special sessions called in U.S. states shows that the voter 
initiative has a significantly positive effect on the number of special sessions called.  This 
implies once again that the voter initiative does impact the operation of the state legislature.  
 Finally this chapter examines the usage of the governor’s veto over the same time period.  
State governors in forty-nine U.S. states enjoy some type of veto power over the legislature.  In 
theory, there is reason to suspect that the governor will not increase usage of the veto when the 
voter initiative is available.  Matsusaka (2005c) explains that the preferences of the state 
governor are generally aligned with the preferences of the state median voter because the 
governor is elected in a statewide election.  Additionally, voter initiatives are not subject to the 
governor’s veto.  Therefore, if the state legislature passes bills in order to avoid a possible voter 
initiative, the governor may be unlikely to veto the legislation even if the legislation is not 
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aligned with the governors preferences because the voters could enact the policy through a voter 
initiative anyways.  The number of gubernatorial vetoes exercised from 1981 – 2001 during the 
regular legislative session is estimated.  The availability of the voter initiative has a significantly 
negative impact on the number of gubernatorial vetoes. 
 Chapter 6 of the dissertation will summarize the major findings of the each of the 
research chapters and discuss the relevant policy implications.  Future areas of research will also 




The Voter Initiative 
 
2.1 The History of the Voter Initiative in U.S. States 
The concept of direct democracy in the U.S. can be traced back to New England in the 1600’s.1  
The referendum process was born through the town hall meetings that were used in order to 
determine policies for the town at the time.  The referendum process was adopted by several 
states in the late 18th and early 19th century.  In 1857, the federal government required all new 
states that entered the union to provide the legislative referendum process for state constitutional 
amendments.  However the voter initiative process, the direct democracy counterpart to the 
referendum, did not gain popularity until late in the 19th century (Initiative and Referendum 
Institute). 
 The voter initiative began to gain popularity in the U.S. around 1885 when Father Robert 
Haire, a South Dakota priest, and Benjamin Urner, a New Jersey publisher, began to lobby for 
the provision of the referendum and voter initiative process in U.S. states.2  The populist and 
progressive movements were established and became quite popular over the next two decades.  
Supporters of the parties had become disillusioned with the government due to constant catering 
to special interest groups.  The parties supported a number of governmental reforms, including 
the voter initiative process (Initiative and Referendum Institute).  They viewed the voter 
initiative as the primary tool by which they could influence policy in the presence of a legislature 
that was subverted to special interests.  Nebraska became the first state to allow local 
                                                 
1 All dates, data, and information in this section, unless noted otherwise, can be found in Citizen Lawmakers by 
Schmidt (1991) and “A Brief History of the Initiative and Referendum Process in the United States” by the Initiative 
and Referendum Institute. 
2 Information found in “The Initiative and Referendum Timeline” by the Initiative and Referendum Institute. 
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governments to use the voter initiative and popular referendum in 1897.  South Dakota became 
the first state to adopt the voter initiative and referendum process at the state level the following 
year.   
 By 1918, 20 states had adopted a form of the voter initiative process.  However, 
legislators in other states resorted to numerous tactics to discourage the voter initiative process.  
Several state legislators ignored advisory referenda that were approved by the voters.  In the case 
of Texas, legislators gave voters the option to adopt the voter initiative process with a 20% 
signature requirement, much higher than other states.  Voters rejected the process because it 
would be unusable with such a high signature requirement (Initiative and Referendum Institute).  
Evidence suggests that some southern and eastern U.S. states did not embrace the voter initiative 
because of a fear that immigrants and African Americans would be able to affect policy 
outcomes (Schmidt, 1991). 
 For over forty years, the voter initiative process was not adopted by any U.S. states.  
Decades after the flurry of voter initiative ratification, Alaska included the voter initiative 
process in their state constitution when they were admitted as a state in 1959.  Three states have 
adopted the voter initiative process since Alaska, with Mississippi being the most recent state in 
1992. The total number of states in which the voter initiative process is available currently stands 
at 24 states.  The majority of these voter initiative states are located in the west.  Figure 2.1 
displays the locations of the voter initiative states throughout the U.S.  However, the voter 
initiative is represented in every region throughout the U.S.  Additionally, numerous states allow 
the voter initiative process at the local government level. 
 
2.2 Differences in the Voter Initiative Process in U.S. States 
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Figure 2.1: U.S. States with the Voter Initiative Process    . 
 
 
Note: The states in which the voter initiative process is available are shaded.  All information for the map is from the 




As mentioned previously, almost half of the U.S. states have some form of the voter initiative.  
However, there are several important differences between voter initiative states that have a 
significant impact on the usage of the voter initiative.  The most important difference between 
states involves the signature requirement.  This determines the number of signatures that must be 
collected in order to successfully place a voter initiative on the ballot.  The signature 
requirements range from 3% to 15% across states with the voter initiative process and generally 
apply to either the votes cast in the previous governor’s election or the votes cast in the previous 
general election.  A higher signature requirement tends to make the proposition of a voter 
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initiative more difficult.  Table 2.1 displays the primary differences among states in which the 
voter initiative process is available. 
 There are a few other differences in the voter initiative process between voter initiative 
states.  The constitutional initiative process and the statutory initiative process are the two types 
of voter initiative processes that are available.  Constitutional initiatives allow the voters to 
propose constitutional amendments and are available in 18 states.  Statutory initiatives allow the 
voters to propose laws or memorials and are available in 21 states.    Additionally, the process 
can be further classified into direct and indirect methods.  A direct initiative is placed directly on 
the ballot where voters directly decide the outcome.  An indirect initiative is first submitted to 
the state legislature.  It is then considered by the legislature before it appears on the ballot.  States 
differ in the availability of direct and indirect initiatives as well. 
 The differences in the voter initiative process among states can have a large effect on the 
impact of the voter initiative.  For example, the signature requirement in Wyoming is 15% of the 
votes cast in the previous legislative election.  It is difficult to gather such a high number of 
signatures (especially in a state with low population density) in comparison to a state with a 
relatively low signature requirement (i.e. California with a 5% signature requirement).  For this 
reason, Wyoming is often excluded from the voter initiative states for research purposes.  Due to 
the signature requirement differences and other dissimilarities in the voter initiative process 
among the U.S. states, the usage and effects of the voter initiative process can vary across states. 
 
2.3 Usage of the Voter Initiative in U.S. States 
The voter initiative has contributed to important policy changes throughout the history of its 
availability in U.S. states.  The voter initiative has been used to address issues from a wide range  
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Table 2.1 - Voter Initiative State Differences 
 
Type of Initiative 
Process Available 
Type of Initiative to Propose 
Constitutional Amendments 
Type of Initiative Process 
to Propose Statutes 




Adopted CA Statute Direct Indirect Direct Indirect CA Statute 
Alaska 1959 O X O O X O O 10 
Arizona 1912 X X X O X O 15 10 
Arkansas 1909 X X X O X O 10 8 
California 1911 X X X O X O 8 5 
Colorado 1912 X X X O X O 5 5 
Florida 1972 X O X O O O 8 O 
Idaho 1912 O X O O X O O 6 
Maine 1908 O X O O O X O 10 
Massachusetts 1918 X X O X O X 3 3.5 
Michigan 1908 X X X O O X 10 8 
Mississippi 1992 X O O X O O 12 O 
Missouri 1906 X X X O X O 8 5 
Montana 1904 X X X O X O 10 5 
Nebraska 1912 X X X O X O 10 7 
Nevada 1904 X X X O O X 10 10 
North Dakota 1914 X X X O X O 4 2 
Ohio 1912 X X X O O X 10 6 
Oklahoma 1907 X X X O X O 15 8 
Oregon 1902 X X X O X O 8 6 
South Dakota 1898 X X X O X O 10 5 
Utah 1900 O X O O X X O 10 
Washington 1912 O X O O X X O 8 
Wyoming 1968 O X O O X O O 15 
Totals 24 states 18 states 21 states 16 states 2 states 16 states 7 states 17 states 21 states 
Legend: X = Process allowed by state constitution       O = Process not allowed by state constitution      CA = Constitutional Amendment 
 
All data is from the Initiative & Referendum Institute. 
 14 
of ideologies as well.  The movement started in the late 20th century with populists and 
progressives as the driving force.  Conservatives, liberals, and libertarians have affected policy 
outcomes through the voter initiative process in the last century (Initiative and Referendum 
Institute).  From 1904 through 2006, 2231 voter initiatives have appeared on state ballots.  887 of 
the voter initiative proposals were adopted by voters.  Approximately 40% of the voter initiatives 
that appear on the ballot are approved by the voters.  While 24 states currently have the voter 
initiative process available, over 60% of the voter initiative activity occurs in six states: Arizona, 
California, Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington (Initiative and Referendum 
Institute). 
 The usage of the voter initiative process has fluctuated rather substantially over time.  
Figure 2.2 shows the usage of the voter initiative by decade in U.S. states.  The voter initiative 
was used substantially from 1910 through 1940.  However, usage of the voter initiative 
decreased steadily in the 1940’s and continued to decline until the 1970’s.  Scholars believe that 
the decline in the usage of the voter initiative was largely due to the Great Depression and the 
wars that took place during the time (Initiative and Referendum Institute).  The new age of the 
voter initiative was ushered in with the passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978.  Usage 
of the voter initiative increased throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.  While usage has not been as 
high in the first decade of the 21st century as in the end of the 20th century, the voter initiative has 
continued to play a large role in shaping policy in U.S. states.  79 voter initiatives appeared on 
the ballots in 2006.  Proposition 187 in California set a spending record with over $150 million 
spent by competing interest groups. 
 
2.4 Important Issues in the Voter Initiative Literature 
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While it is complicated to objectively assess whether the voter initiative improves the 
performance of the government, the recent literature has addressed several issues in order to 
evaluate the voter initiative process.  Matsusaka (2004, 2005a) provides an extensive assessment 
of the subject by examining the theory behind the voter initiative and the crucial components of 
the argument.  The role of money in the voter initiative process, voter competence, and the key 
issue of whether the voter initiative leads to policies that favor the views of the median voter 
must be addressed in the evaluation of the voter initiative process. 
 In order to evaluate the voter initiative process, it is quite useful to outline several issues 
that are closely related to the voter initiative process.  This involves examining agency problems, 
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logrolling and candidate positions, and information quality in order to understand how the voter 
initiative operates under different circumstances (Matsusaka 2005a).  Agency problems can exist 
among legislators because constituents may not be able to effectively supervise and control the 
behavior of elected officials (Kau & Rubin 1979, Kalt & Zupan 1984, Peltzman 1984).  If 
legislators are pursuing activities contrary to the views of the median voter, then the voter 
initiative can offer a method by which the general public can directly alter the policy set by 
legislators.  The availability of the voter initiative process can also have an indirect effect on the 
decisions of legislators.  Legislators may consider the possibility that constituents can propose a 
voter initiative when making decisions, which could alter the final decision of the elected 
officials (Matsusaka 2005a).  Both of these effects should tend to benefit the median voter.  In 
order for a voter initiative to pass and directly affect policy, a majority of voters must agree with 
the voter initiative.  In order for the legislators to alter a decision due to the possibility of a voter 
initiative, the legislators must perceive the voter initiative as an imminent credible threat. This 
can only happen when the legislators believe that a majority of voters will support a voter 
initiative.  The result will tend to be a policy that is more aligned with the views of the median 
voter.  However, the voter initiative process does not guarantee that policies will be precisely 
aligned with the views of the median voter.  Voters are only afforded the options of the policy 
that is supported by the legislators and the policy that is offered by an interest group as a voter 
initiative (Romer & Rosenthal 1979).  Additionally, it is possible that the availability of the voter 
initiative could cause the legislators to enact policies that actually harm the median voter if 
asymmetric information is present (Matsusaka 2005a).  If legislators mistakenly perceive that the 
threat of a voter initiative from a narrow economic interest group or extreme interest group as the 
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beliefs of the median voter, the legislators may enact a policy contrary to the views of the median 
voter (Gerber and Lupia 1995, Matsusaka and McCarty 2001).   
 The voter initiative is also able to give individuals an opportunity to combat logrolling, 
the process of vote trading among legislators in which a number of issues are bundled into one 
bill and voted on as a whole.  Citizens have the opportunity to challenge individual issues 
through the voter initiative process (Matsusaka 2005a).  If logrolling is a process that results in 
inefficient spending on pork barrel politics (Buchanan & Tullock 1962), then the voter initiative 
may help lead to a reduction in inefficient spending.  However, if the process of logrolling results 
in efficient outcomes due to legislators trading for the policies that they prefer the strongest 
(Buchanan & Tullock 1962), then it is possible that the voter initiative could result in a decrease 
in efficiency (Matsusaka 1995).  The voter initiative also allows individuals to separate 
candidates from certain issues.  If citizens are able to challenge policies with the voter initiative, 
then candidates will have fewer issues on which to take positions when running for election.  
Besley and Coate (2003) and Matsusaka (2005a) find that voters can better identify and elect 
candidates that support the most important issues in the voter’s minds when the candidates 
support fewer issues in general. 
 The issue of information quality must also be considered in the voter initiative process.  
The main point of contention rests in the question of whether individuals have the necessary 
information to make appropriate decisions.  Following the logic of Hayek (1945), information 
that is dispersed in the minds of the people cannot be completely known by any number of 
politicians.  According to this reasoning, the voter initiative may allow for better decisions as 
individuals are given an avenue to express their true desires.  However, opponents of the voter 
initiative argue that the voters do not possess the proper information to make decisions.  Maskin 
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and Tirole (2004) propose that legislators possess information that voters do not, which suggests 
that the voter initiative process could lead to harmful decisions.  Additionally, Kessler (2005) 
finds that use of the voter initiative may cause legislators to invest less time attempting to collect 
and gauge information from the voters.  However, the process of voting results in the 
compilation of the information that is in the minds of millions of voters.  According to the law of 
large numbers, it is possible that this combination can help overcome information problems even 
if any individual voter has a small probability of possessing accurate information (McLennan 
1998, Lupia 2001).   
 While the issue of informational quality continues to be debated, Matsusaka (1992) 
suggests that the effectiveness of the voter initiative may depend on the nature of the issue.  He 
reasons that issues that involve value based judgments may be best decided by the voters because 
the necessary information for these decisions rests in the mind of the voters.  Technical issues 
that involve the knowledge of specific details may be best decided by experts.  He finds some 
evidence that issues are decided in this manner. 
 The examination of the situations in which the voter initiative may be beneficial or 
harmful is useful to help evaluate the debated issues surrounding the voter initiative process.  
The first point of contention involves the issue of money.  Huge sums of money are involved in 
the voter initiative process.  For example, the cost of gathering the required signatures to simply 
place a voter initiative on the ballot in California exceeds $1 million dollars.  This fails to include 
any costs of supporting or campaigning against the voter initiative (Matsusaka 2005a).  For 
example, California’s Proposition 187 involved over $150 million in spending.  Opponents of the 
voter initiative process view the large amounts of money involved in the process as beneficial to 
narrow special interest groups.  The basic idea is that these groups can spend large sums of 
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money to get voter initiatives on the ballot and then convince voters to support the voter 
initiatives.  However, reasoning seems to suggest that the voter initiative poses less of a threat of 
subversion to special interest groups than elected legislators.  Once legislators are elected, they 
are able to direct resources to campaign contributors without the consent of the voters.  The voter 
initiative at least allows the possibility for the voters to reject a policy that does not have the 
support of the majority (Matsusaka 2004). 
 Furthermore, recent studies suggest that while money does play an important role in the 
voter initiative process, large money expenditures does not necessarily lead to the passage of 
voter initiatives3.  Gerber (1999) finds that spending generally has small and insignificant effects 
on the probability of succeeding with a voter initiative.  This finding appears to be the result of 
the resources available to narrow special interest groups.  The special interest groups generally 
have large amounts of money, but often lack the support of the voters.  It is unlikely that 
spending money will be able to change the minds of the voters, especially if the voter initiative 
appears to directly benefit narrow interest groups.  On the other hand, broad based citizen groups 
may be better at successfully passing voter initiatives due to a larger support base.  These groups 
have larger membership bases and often sponsor issues that are supported by larger proportions 
of the population.  Lupia (1994) and Lupia and Johnston (2001) also find that spending large 
sums of money generally does not assist in the passage of initiatives that are supported by narrow 
interest groups.  Broad based support is necessary for the passage of a voter initiative. 
 Despite the fact that special interest groups may not be able to successfully enact policy 
changes directly through the voter initiative process, they may be able to garner enough interest 
                                                 
3 Lowenstein (1982) and Magleby (1984) initially examined this issue with basic comparisons.  The rates of passage 
for voter initiatives in which opposing sides spent equivalent amounts of money were compared to the rates of 
passage for voter initiatives where one side largely outspent the other.  Both studies found large spending 
differences to have a very small effect on the rate of passage of voter initiatives.  However, they also found that 
large spending often can help defeat voter initiatives. 
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in the topic for the legislators to enact policies that are better aligned with the interest group’s 
preferences.  If the interest group can signal to the legislators that some proposed policy measure 
is supported by a decent share of the voters, the legislators may perceive the proposed voter 
initiative as a threat.  Rather than risk the possibility of the passage of a voter initiative that could 
result in an unfavorable outcome in views of the legislators, the legislators may enact a policy 
that benefits the special interest group (Matsusaka 2004).  Gerber (1999) finds that businesses 
often propose and support voter initiatives primarily to influence the actions of legislators.  The 
findings were obtained through the use of surveys of business groups.  
 While money may not improve the success rate of voter initiatives, it does seem to play a 
large role in the defeat of voter initiatives.  Bowler and Donovan (1998) find that voters 
generally refute voter initiatives when the outcomes of the initiative appear unclear.  Voters seem 
to choose to remain with the current policy when this situation arises due to the fear that a new 
policy may result in harmful consequences.  Matsusaka (2004) suggests that interest groups that 
spend money to defeat a voter initiative may be successful if the campaign generates uncertainty 
among voters.  Gerber (1999) finds that spending tends to have large and significant effects on 
the probability of defeating a voter initiative.   
 A second issue of discord among the proponents and opponents of the voter initiative 
involves voter competence.  The American voters are often perceived to be incompetent when it 
comes to knowledge of basic politics and issues involving the government4.  Delli Carpini and 
Ketter (1996) display that voters incorrectly answer questions involving politics and government 
on a regular basis.  However, Matsusaka (2004, 2005a) suggests that voters do not necessarily 
need to possess all of the information pertaining to an issue in order to correctly take a position 
                                                 
 
4 Magleby (1984) and Broder (2001) suggest that voters are persuaded by expensive advertising and are incapable of 
making complex voting decisions due to a lack of proper knowledge. 
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according to their preferences.  He notes that individuals routinely make decisions based on very 
limited amounts of information.  Voters can use information from various sources, including 
friends, news, and interest groups, in order to choose the correct stance on an issue.   
 Several studies support the concept that voters can project their true preferences through 
voting on voter initiatives despite a lack of knowledge surrounding the specific details of the 
issue.  Lupia (1994) used exit poll surveys involving five California voter initiatives in 1988 to 
examine the impact of information on voting.  While the five voter initiatives involved rather 
complex details about insurance issues, Lupia found that voters who knew little about the 
specific details of the voter initiatives could reproduce the voting preferences of informed voters 
if they knew the position of the insurance group supporting the voter initiative.  While the 
uninformed voters could not answer questions relating to the specific details of the propositions, 
they were able to correctly vote according to their preferences due to the information signals 
from the supporting interest groups.  Uninformed voters that could not identify the positions of 
interest groups were unable to display their true preferences and voted quite differently than the 
other two groups.  Bowler and Donovan (1998) find that voters are generally able to reveal their 
true preferences and values through the voter initiative process.  Additionally, they find that 
voters tend to simply vote against issues that they lack the necessary information in which to 
make a decision that reflects their true preferences.5 
 Although evidence seems to suggest that a lack of voter competence does not pose a 
serious problem to the voter initiative, Matsusaka (2005a) argues that the overall effectiveness of 
                                                 
 
5 Additional studies conclude that individuals are competent to make decisions involving the voter initiative.  
According to Lupia and Johnston (2001), allowing voters to decide on policy issues using the voter initiative does 
not harm outcomes in societies with open channels of communication.  Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) and Kahn 
(2002) find that individuals vote in favor of voter initiatives that result in economic benefits for the individual while 
voters will vote against legislation that harms their economic interests. 
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democracy in general would be the primary concern if voters lacked the knowledge to correctly 
convey their preferences.  When selecting a candidate for office, voters must choose among 
candidates supporting a bundle of issues.  Voters often are not familiar with all of the specific 
positions that a candidate holds.  In the case of the voter initiative, the voter is only deciding on 
one issue.  If concerns over the competence of voters are a serious issue, the entire democratic 
process would be affected. 
 While the role of money in the voter initiative process and the issue of voter competence 
are important parts of the debate surrounding the voter initiative, the policies that are the result of 
the voter initiative process are the most important measure of the value of the voter initiative 
process.  Recent investigations have empirically analyzed the impact of the voter initiative on 
policy outcomes rather than relying on the relatively subjective analysis that was typical of the 
studies of the past.  Matsusaka (2004) examined spending and taxation in U.S. states in order to 
evaluate the impact of the voter initiative.  He finds that states in which the voter initiative 
process is available tend to have lower levels of state spending and lower taxes, employ more 
user fees, and spend more at the local government level than states in which the voter initiative 
process is unavailable.  He then examines opinion surveys from U.S. states and finds that the 
vast majority of individuals support the policies that are found in states in which the voter 
initiative is available.  This seems to suggest that the median voter benefits from the availability 
of the voter initiative process.  
 Additional research also seems to suggest that the voter initiative helps to move policy 
toward the preferences of the median voter.  Gerber (1996, 1999) finds that the death penalty and 
parental notification of abortions for minors are more prevalent in states in which the voter 
initiative process is available.  She then uses opinion survey data to estimate the preferences of 
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the median voter.  The findings reveal that the median voter prefers the policies in that are found 
in voter initiative states.  Matsusaka (2004) finds that states in which the voter initiative is 
available are more likely to have legislative term limits than states that lack the voter initiative 
process.6  Once again, surveys suggest that voter strongly favor term limits for elected officials. 
 This section highlights some of the most notable contributions to the voter initiative 
literature in recent years.  While the recent surge in the usage of the voter initiative has resulted 
in an increase in research in the area, the voter initiative process continues to receive far less 
attention than the democratic voting process in general.  The remainder of this dissertation 
contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of the voter initiative on 
government spending, the power of the legislative and executive branches, and the production of 
legislation in U.S. states. 
                                                 
 
6 Only 2 out of 26 states without the voter initiative process have some type of legislative term limits while 22 out of 
24 voter initiative states have some form of term limit. 
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Chapter 3 
Do Voter Initiatives Affect the Interest Group Orientation of Government Spending? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The recently renewed interest in voter initiatives has rekindled a debate surrounding the primary 
beneficiaries of the voter initiative process.  Matsusaka (2005a) outlines the primary arguments 
on both sides of the debate.  Proponents of the voter initiative argue that the voter initiative 
generally shifts political power away from interest groups and toward the median voter.  
According to this theory, the voter initiative gives the public a method to check the activities of 
legislatures that would otherwise tend to cater to narrow special interest groups.   The voter 
initiative also provides an indirect threat to any decisions made by the legislature.  The 
legislators may make decisions that are more aligned with the views of the median voter in order 
to avoid a possible future voter initiative that might be less favorable to the legislature.  
Opponents of the voter initiative, however, believe that well-organized and well-funded 
special interest groups may actually benefit from the voter initiative at the expense of the median 
voter.  Supporters of this view often point to the massive amounts of money involved in the few 
voter initiatives that actually appear on the ballot each year.  Over $400 million was spent on 
voter initiatives throughout the states in 1998 alone in comparison to $326 million that was spent 
by all parties in the 2000 presidential campaign, for example (Matsusaka 2005a).  In 2006, 
spending on California’s Proposition 187 eclipsed $150 million.  This hypothesis is based on 
several possible lines of reasoning.  Special interest groups may be able to motivate their 
supporters to vote while much of the general population does not vote.  Individuals that do vote 
may lack the knowledge and information to vote in their own best interest, and instead vote in 
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favor of a narrow special interest group due to misleading information.  Finally, the behavior of 
legislators may be distorted by the threat of the voter initiative, leading to the passage of laws 
that harm the general public. 
 Another important contribution to the voter initiative literature involves the behavior of 
interest groups when the voter initiative process is available.  The voter initiative affords another 
method by which interest groups can influence policy outcomes.  In addition to targeting the 
votes of the legislature, interest groups may now also covet the direct support of voters.  Interest 
group mobilization tends to increase when the voter initiative process is available as the increase 
in the expected benefits of mobilization outweighs the expected costs of mobilization (Boehmke 
2002, 2005).  Additionally, due to the nature of the voter initiative process, broad based citizen 
groups seem to benefit to a greater extent than narrow economic special interest groups.  This 
results in an increase of broad based citizen group representation relative to other economic 
special interest groups (Boehmke 2002, 2005). 
An interesting related issue is whether the voter initiative is able to change the 
composition of government spending.  Total state government spending should be a quasi-public 
good because government spending is used for both public and private goods.  It would be 
informative to see if the voter initiative can affect the degree to which government spending is 
public.  A greater level of private spending would suggest that the spending was furthering the 
welfare of special interest groups.  If less private spending were to be found in voter initiative 
states accounting for other variables, then the evidence would suggest that the voter initiative 
helps to restrict the influence of special interest groups.  This paper examines this issue using a 
median voter model to estimate the publicness of total state government spending.  Section II 
discusses the effect of the voter initiative on policy outcomes and interest group behavior.  
  26 
Section III describes the model.  Section IV presents and discusses the empirical results.  Section 
V concludes. 
 
3.2 Does the Voter Initiative Favor the Median Voter? 
It is difficult to simply judge whether the voter initiative enhances the performance of 
government due to the subjective nature of the question.  However, the general argument 
concerning the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative has not changed since Nebraska 
became the first U.S. state to adopt the voter initiative process over a century ago.  Does the 
voter initiative shift power into the hands of the voters or does it simply provide narrow special 
interest groups with more power to enact programs in their interests?  Although well-organized 
and well-funded special interest groups probably exert more influence than voters on both the 
legislature and the voter initiative process (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004), the true question 
involves the relative shift of power provided by the voter initiative process.     
When solely examining the theory behind the voter initiative, the effect of the voter 
initiative on policy outcomes is ambiguous.1  The voter initiative can help overcome agency 
problems between legislators and constituents, logrolling, and issues involving information 
quality in some cases.  However, the voter initiative can lead to outcomes that are unfavorable to 
the median voter under other conditions.  Additionally, the issues of voter competence and the 
role of money in the voter initiative process have long been a point of discord between 
supporters and opponents of the voter initiative (Matsusaka 2004, 2005a, 2005b). 
In order to evaluate the results of the voter initiative, it is important to note that the 
incentive structure for interest groups is altered when the voter initiative is available.  Interest 
                                                 
1 See Matsusaka (2004, 2005a, 2005b) for a complete discussion of voter initiative theory. 
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groups gain the advantage of the ability to directly propose a change in policy with the voter 
initiative, breaking the monopoly of the legislature.  Additionally, the voter initiative can 
indirectly affect the decisions of legislators as they must consider the threat of a voter initiative 
when making policy decisions.  Due to the possible increase in benefits to interest groups, the 
voter initiative tends to lead to an increase in the mobilization of interest groups in states that 
have the voter initiative process (Boehmke 2002, 2005).  Boehmke (2002, 2005) compares the 
number of interest groups in voter initiative states to non-initiative states.  After controlling for 
other variables, he finds that the availability of the voter initiative tends to increase the quantity 
of interest groups.2  
 A key related issue involves the type of interest groups that receive the most benefit from 
the voter initiative process.  Due to the nature of the voter initiative process, it seems reasonable 
that broad-based citizen groups would have an advantage over narrow economic special interest 
groups.  For example, environmental activists may gain power relative to a concentrated 
manufacturing industry interest group.  In order to successfully propose and possibly pass a voter 
initiative (or to achieve a policy change indirectly through the threat of a voter initiative), an 
interest group must be able to generate the support of the majority of the voters.  This should be 
more feasible for citizen groups because they generally encompass a larger share of public 
support (Boehmke 2005).  This becomes especially important if the economic groups are more 
successful at achieving policy outcomes in the absence of the voter initiative process.3  Boehmke 
(2002, 2005) finds that voter initiative states have a greater relative increase in citizen groups 
than economic groups.  Furthermore, Gerber (1999) finds that citizen groups are more successful 
                                                 
2 Boehmke (2005) finds that states with the voter initiative tend to have about 28 percent more interest groups than 
non-initiative states. 
3 Many papers have noted the possible influence of special interest groups on the legislature, including Weingast, 
Shepsle, and Johnsen (1982), McCormick and Tollison (1981), and Holcombe (1985). 
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at achieving policy changes through the voter initiative process in comparison to narrow special 
interest groups.4 
 However the crucial determinant of the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative rests 
in the policies that are the result of the voter initiative.  Until recently, the policy outcomes of the 
voter initiative process were evaluated on a relatively subjective basis through observations.  
Matsusaka (2004) provides a compelling empirical assessment of the voter initiative by 
examining state and local spending and taxation throughout the previous century.  His study 
finds important differences between voter initiative states and non-initiative states.  His primary 
result is that voter initiative states tend to have lower levels of spending and lower taxes.  
Furthermore, he finds that voter initiative states tend to rely more heavily on user fees as 
opposed to general taxes.  Voter initiative states also tend to spend more at the local level and 
less at the state level.  In order to evaluate the support for these differences in policies, 
Matsusaka examines results from opinion surveys.  He finds that a large majority of the 
population favors all of these policy differences that can be found in voter initiative states.  His 
study suggests that the voter initiative process does, in fact, benefit the median voter relative to 
interest groups. 
 Opinion surveys regarding term limits and social issues seem to further suggest that 
policies enacted in voter initiative states are favored by the median voter.  A vast majority of 
voter initiative states have a type of legislative term limit while most states that lack the voter 
initiative process do not.5  Surveys suggest that voters strongly support the concept of term 
limits.  This issue is especially important considering that term limits are one issue where 
                                                 
4 Additionally, Bowler, McCuan, and Fernandez (1998) find that a large majority of the voter initiatives proposed in 
California from 1986 to 1996 were supported by broad based groups.  Ernst (2001) found similar results on all state 
ballots from 1898 to 1995. 
5 Only 2 out of states in which the voter initiative process in unavailable have some type of legislative term limits 
while 22 out of 24 voter initiative states have some form of term limit. 
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legislators are placed directly at odds with the voters (Matsusaka 2004).  Gerber (1999) finds that 
voter initiative states are more likely to approve the death penalty and parental notification for 
abortions.  Once again, opinion surveys suggest that these policies are preferred by the majority.   
 The initial empirical evaluations of the voter initiative imply that the voter initiative leads 
to the adoption of policies that are supported by the median voter.  However critics remain 
skeptical and view the voter initiative simply as a method by which special interest groups can 
further their welfare at the expense of the median voter.  In fact, Boehmke (2002, 2005) finds 
that a larger number of interest groups exist in states in which the voter initiative process is 
available.  The question clearly merits further investigation as the debate over the primary 
beneficiary of the voter initiative continues. 
 
3.3 The Model 
This paper uses an empirical median voter model to estimate the degree of publicness of total 
state government spending.6  Turnbull and Mitias (1995) provide justification for the use of this 
empirical median voter model.  The model has been used to examine the demand for public 
goods and services by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).  
Deno and Mehay (1987) examine two different government forms and the related levels of 
expenditure with the model.  A publicness measure of legislative activities is tested by Holcombe 
and Sobel (1995).  Additional examples include Langbein’s (2004) estimation of the publicness 
in public school music using the median voter model and King’s (2006) examination of the 
spillover effects of public education.  A higher degree of private spending suggests that interest 
groups exert a larger impact on spending.  Special interest legislation is a private good as the 
                                                 
 
6 Bowen (1943) originally constructed the model.  Downs (1957) and Black (1958) further contributed to the theory 
behind the model. 
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benefits accrue to specific members of the population.  The voter initiative would restrain the 
influence of interest groups if less private spending were to be found in states in which the voter 
initiative process is available. 
When considering a pure public good, the optimal amount of the good provided in a state 
should not change when an additional individual relocates into the state.  This is due to the fact 
that pure public goods are joint-in consumption.  An extra individual can share in the amount of 
the pure public good that is already provided in the state.  For example, no further highway 
spending would be required for an additional individual to use an uncongested rural highway. On 
the other hand, the amount of spending for a pure private good will increase as additional 
individuals relocate to a state.  Spending on a state farm subsidy program, for example, would 
expand if an additional farmer moved into the state.  These goods are consumed by an individual 
and are not joint-in-consumption.  When examining total state spending, it seems reasonable that 
a percentage of the spending will be private while the rest will be public.  The publicness 
estimate will measure the percentage of government spending that is public. 
The estimation of publicness explains the summation of individual demand curves in the 
market for total government spending.  Pure private goods are rival-in-consumption and a 
horizontal summation of individual demand curves must be used in order to arrive at the social 
benefit curve.  Total benefit is simply limited to the benefit that accrues to the individual 
consumer.  Pure public goods are joint-in-consumption and the corresponding individual demand 
curves are added vertically.  Society shares the benefits provided by these goods.  The degree to 
which the individual demand curves are added vertically or horizontally to create the social 
benefit curve is estimated by the publicness measure (King 2006).  A good with a greater degree 
of publicness would result in a larger angle with a more vertical summation of individual 
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demand curves.  A smaller angle would suggest a more horizontal summation of individual 
demand curves due to a good that is private to a larger degree.  This relationship is displayed in 
Figure 3.1. 
Assuming that total state government expenditure is determined in a political framework 
and voters have demands for the output generated by the expenditures, the median voter model 
can be used to estimate the demand for government provided goods.7  Voters will base their 
decision for the amount of desired government provided goods on the comparison of the 
marginal benefits of government provided goods with their marginal tax prices.  The median 
voter will be decisive in the determination of the amount of government provided goods.  The 
utility function of the median voter is as follows 
 
),( iiii sXUU =      (1) 
 
where is  is the amount of government provided goods consumed by the median voter and iX  is 
the total amount of other goods consumed.  The amount of government provided goods 
consumed by the median voter ( is ) is related to the total amount of government provided goods 
( S ) through the function 
     SNsi
γ−=       (2) 
 
in which N represents the total state population.   
A value of 0=γ  would imply that government provided goods are pure public goods, 
while a value of 1=γ  would imply that government provided goods are purely private.  When 
0=γ , Ssi =  and each individual consumes the total amount of the good available.  When  
                                                 
 
7 Inman (1978) and Holcombe (1980) provide empirical evidence suggesting that the median voter is decisive in 
majority rules politics. 
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Figure 3.1: Publicness Measure 
 
 
Individual demand curves are represented by 1D , 2D , and 3D .  γ  is reflected in the angle that is the result of 
either a horizontal or vertical summation of the individual demands for a good.  A measure of γ  equal to zero 
implies a public good with a vertical demand summation.  A measure of γ  equal to one implies a private good with 




1=γ , NSsi /=  and each individual consumes an equal fraction of the good available.  A quasi-
public good would be the result of any value of γ  between 0 and 1.  A relatively more public 
good would be accompanied by a value of γ  closer to zero.   
 In order to reveal the median voter’s demand function for government provided goods, 
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Y  is the median voter’s disposable income, XP  is the price of other goods X , iT  is the 
tax share of the median voter, and SP  is the price per unit of government provided goods. 
 The budget constraint can be rewritten after substituting from equation (2) as 
 
     γNsPTXPY iSiiXi +=       (4) 
 
which generates the demand equation through optimization 
 
     ),,,,( iSiXii TNPTPss =     (5) 
 
Following the previous literature, I assume that XP  and SP  are the same across states for 
empirical purposes.  Including a vector A  to represent differences in preferences across states 
and using a constant elasticity demand function, the following is obtained 
 
     λαγ iii YNTAs )(=      (6) 
 
Substituting is  from (2) into (6) represents the total demand for S  as follows 
 
     λαγα ii YNATS




     λδα ii YNATS =      (8) 
 
where )1( αγδ += .  The demand equation for the median voter in log form is  
 
    ii YNTAS lnlnlnlnln λδα +++=     (9) 
 
The median voter’s disposable income iY  is calculated as 
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     FGTYY iii −+= *      (10) 
 
where *iY  is gross state median income, G  is the amount of federal grants to the median voter’s 
state,8 and F  is the federal tax liability of the median voter.9  GTi  is used to represent the share 
of federal grants that accrue to the median voter.  This requires the assumption that the voter’s 
tax share is equivalent to the voter’s share in the benefit of federal grants.10  iT  is calculated by 
taking the effective average tax rate on sales and income taxes11 and multiplying by the median 
income in order to obtain the median state sales and income tax liability, and then dividing the 
value by total state general sales and income tax revenue.12 
Due to differences in voter preferences across states, other variables are included from 
parameter A  in (9) to give us the following empirical specification 
 
DENYNTS ii lnlnlnlnln 54321 βββββ ++++=  
εββββ +++++ CPOPLOCALNWAGE 9876 lnlnln        (11) 
 
 
where DEN is state population density, AGE is median state age, NW is the state percentage of 
non-white population, LOCAL is the state number of county and municipal governments per 
square mile, CPOP is the state growth rate of population, and ε  is the error term. 13 
                                                 
 
8 Borcherding and Deacon (1972) justify the inclusion of federal government grants in the calculation of state 
disposable income for voters. 
9 Federal tax liability was calculated by finding the relevant federal income tax for state median income.  Inman 
(1978) provides evidence that median voter data is appropriate for voting models. 
10 Gramlich (1968) and Wilde (1968) indicate that federal grants are in theory a good substitute for state revenues. 
11 The effective average tax rate on sales and income tax was taken directly from Feenberg and Rosen (1985) for 
1980.  The 1990 and 2000 effective tax rates are borrowed from the National Center for Higher Education 
Management Systems. 
12 The examples of papers employing the median voter model previously mentioned use this method to calculate 
disposable income. 
13 Wyoming is excluded as a voter initiative state due to its extremely large signature requirement (15 percent).  
Illinois is excluded because it is the only state that limits usage of the voter initiative to changes in the organization 
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 In order to estimate the difference in the measure of publicness between voter initiative 
states and states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable, interaction terms are 
included to capture the marginal effect of the tax share and population variables in voter 
initiative states.  Including I as a dummy variable for voter initiative states, the following 
empirical specification is obtained 
 
DENYNINTITS iii lnlnln*lnln*lnln 7654321 βββββββ ++++++=  
  εββββ +++++ CPOPLOCALNWAGE 111098 lnlnln         (12) 
 
 
 The measure of publicness is calculated as 
 
     )1/( αδγ +=       (13) 
 
The resulting value determines the percentage of private spending.14  The measure of the 
publicness of government spending in non-initiative states ( Nγ ) is calculated from (12) as: 
 
 )1/()( 24 ββγ +=N      (14) 
 
where 2β  is the estimated elasticity of state government expenditure with respect to population 
and 4β  is the estimated elasticity of state government expenditure with respect to tax share.  The 
measure of the publicness of government spending in voter initiative states ( Iγ ) is calculated 
from (12) as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the state’s legislature.  This follows the work of Matsusaka (2004).  Including Wyoming or Illinois does not 
significantly alter the results. 
14 As mentioned earlier, because they are joint-in-consumption, government spending on public goods will not 
directly change when population increases.  Spending on private goods, however, will increase.  However, one 
factor that complicates this distinction is that even with a pure public good, when another person shares in the 
consumption of the public good, it also results in a reduction in the tax share per person.  Thus, for a pure public 
good, this increase in population would result in a reduction in the cost per person (the tax share) as individuals 
relocate to the state other things constant.  As this price falls, the quantity demanded of government provided goods 
will increase.  Therefore, the optimal amount of total government spending will increase as individuals relocate to a 
state regardless of the relationship between total state spending and population.  This is why the publicness 
parameter is a nonlinear combination of both the population and tax share elasticities. 
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)1/()( 3254 ββββγ +++=I     (15) 
 
3β  and 5β  add the marginal effect of the voter initiative to the elasticity of state government 
expenditure with respect to population and tax share, respectively.  The calculated statistics Nγ  
and Iγ  can be interpreted as the degree to which total state government spending is a private 
good.  A value of 1 would suggest that total state spending is entirely private while a value of 0 
would suggest it to be purely public. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
The empirical specification (12) was estimated using state government expenditure data.  The 
data sources are listed in the appendix.  The first estimation was performed using cross section 
data only for 1980.  The second estimation uses pooled cross section data from both 1990 and 
2000.  These were estimated separately due to differences in the available measure of the 
effective average tax rate on sales and income for the different years.15  A third estimation is 
performed using pooled cross section data for the combination of all three years.  The two pooled 
regressions include dummies year fixed effects.16  
The results of the regression are displayed in Table 3.1.  Total state government spending 
was approximately 89 percent private for states without the voter initiative process and 97 
percent private for initiative states in the 1980 regression.  This indicates that spending was about 
8 percent more interest-group oriented in states in which the voter initiative process is available.   
                                                 
15Feenberg and Rosen (1985) provided estimates of the effective average tax rate on sales and income for 1980.  The 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems estimates the effective average tax rate on sales and 
income tax for 1990 and 2000. 
16 Alaska is excluded in all years due to the significant revenues from severance taxes on oil and the lack of 
individual income and sales taxes.  New Hampshire is excluded in 1980 and Nevada is excluded in 1990 due to 
missing data.   
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Table 3.1: Total State Government Expenditure Estimates 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates 
 1980 1990 & 2000  
Pooled 
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Year 1980 (EIGHTY) - - -0.8191*** 
(.01374) 
Nγ  ~ Non-Initiative States 0.8882 0.9073 0.8941 
Iγ  ~ Initiative States 0.9706 0.9962 0.9885 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9758 0.9840 0.9826 
F-statistic 190.23 538.26 677.64 
Observations 48 97 145 
Standard errors are noted in parenthesis.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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The pooled regression for 1990 and 2000 shows that total state government spending was about 
91 percent private in states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable while the spending 
in voter initiative states was almost purely private.  Spending was again approximately 8 percent 
more private in voter initiative states.  Finally, the pooled regression for 1980, 1990, and 2000 
displays that about 89 percent of total state government spending was private in states that lack 
the voter initiative process.  Voter initiative state spending was around 99 percent private.  Once 
again, a greater degree of private spending is found in the voter initiative states.  Total state 
government spending is approximately 9 percent higher in voter initiative states. 
 The estimates for the publicness of total state government spending are calculated using 
nonlinear combinations of the parameters for tax share elasticity and population elasticity.  
Therefore a Monte Carlo simulation is performed to ensure that the calculated values are 
significantly different from one and that the publicness estimates are significantly different 
between voter initiative states and states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable.  A 
simulation of 3000 such calculations was generated using the parameter estimates in conjunction 
with the covariance matrix of the estimates.  Table 3.2 shows the results from this Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The point estimates differ slightly from the mean estimates from the empirical 
distribution because the covariance between the coefficient estimates makes the expected value 
of the ratio of the coefficient estimates different from the ratio of expected values of each 
individual coefficient.   
The confidence intervals for the measure of publicness in states without the voter 
initiative process show that the value is significantly less than one.  This signifies that total state 
spending is not a pure private good.  However, the confidence intervals for the voter initiative 
state measure of publicness show the value is not significantly different from one, suggesting  
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Table 3.2: Monte Carlo Point Estimates for Nγ and Iγ , Estimated Mean Differences for Nγ - 
Iγ , and Confidence Intervals 
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that spending in voter initiative states may even be a pure private good.  The confidence intervals 
for the mean difference show that the publicness of total state government spending is 
significantly different between voter initiative and non-initiative states at a 90 percent confidence 
level for both the 1980 regression and the 1980 and 2000 pooled regression.  Total state 
government spending is significantly different at both the 90 percent and the 95 percent 
confidence level for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 pooled regression. 
 These results indicate that total state government spending is private to a greater extent in 
voter initiative states in comparison to states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable.  
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This suggests that interest groups may influence a larger percentage of state spending in states 
that have the voter initiative process.  State government spending for legislation sponsored by 
interest groups will tend to be a private good, as the benefits of the legislation accrues in a rival 
fashion to the members of the group rather than in a non-rival fashion to society at large.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that narrow special interest groups have a larger 
influence in states with the voter initiative process.  Voter initiative states have more broad-based 
citizen groups (Boehmke 2002, 2005) and broad-based citizen groups are more effective at 
passing voter initiatives (Gerber 1999). 
  Other interesting results are observable in Table 3.1.  The tax share elasticity estimate, 
α  or 2β  in the empirical model, is negative and very significant in all regressions.  The estimate 
is less than one, suggesting that the demand for state government expenditures is price inelastic.  
The coefficient for the marginal effect of tax share elasticity in voter initiative states is positive 
and significant.  This suggests that demand for state government spending is more price inelastic 
in voter initiative states.  The estimate for population elasticity, δ  or 4β  in the empirical model, 
is positive and significant for all regressions.  The coefficient for the marginal effect of 
population elasticity for the voter initiative states is also positive and significant.  The income 
elasticity estimate, λ  or 6β  in the empirical model, is positive and significant in every 
regression.  The coefficient suggests that the demand for state government spending is income 
inelastic as the value is less than one.   
The remaining five independent variables were included because previous literature using 
the median voter demand model incorporated the variables.  However, their exclusion does not 
significantly alter the results of the other estimates.  Population density is negative in the 1990 
and 2000 pooled estimate and positive otherwise.  It is significant in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 
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pooled regression.  Median age and the non-white percentage of the population are both negative 
in the 1980 cross section regression and positive otherwise.  They are insignificant with the 
exception of median age in the 1990 and 2000 pooled estimate.  Negative estimates are found for 
the number of local governments per square mile and the population growth rate for all 
estimates.  Both are significant in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 pooled regression while the 
population growth estimate is significant in the 1990 and 2000 pooled estimate.  The year 
variables are negative and significant in all cases.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Proponents of the voter initiative argue that political outcomes will be more aligned with the 
preferences of the median voter when the voter initiative is available.  Opponents believe that the 
voter initiative is subject to abuse by special interest groups.  This debate surrounding the 
primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative has been disputed for over a century.  The results of 
this paper imply that the availability of the voter initiative does not reduce the interest group 
orientation of state government spending.  Total state spending is found to be significantly more 
of a private good in states in which the voter initiative is available.  Interest groups support 
policies that engage in spending that benefits the interest group.  The resulting expenditures are a 
private good as the benefits accrue directly to the members of the group rather than to the 
population in general.  At the very least, we can refute the idea that interest groups exert less 
influence over total state expenditures in states in which the voter initiative process is available.   
 This outcome seems to be consistent with the conclusion of Boehmke (2002, 2005).  He 
finds that states with the voter initiative process have larger interest group populations.  This 
occurs due to the increased benefit of interest group mobilization when the option of the voter 
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initiative is available.  The voter initiative affords interest groups the ability to directly propose 
changes in policy and to indirectly influence the legislature with the threat of a voter initiative.  
However we cannot assume that narrow special interest groups are the primary beneficiary of the 
voter initiative.  Boehmke (2003, 2005) also finds that broad based citizen groups increase in 
size relative to narrow special interest groups.  This is primarily due to the nature of the voter 
initiative process.  Broad based support is necessary to successfully pass a voter initiative.  
Therefore, while the interest group orientation of state government spending might increase as a 
result of the presence of the voter initiative process in a state, it is unclear if it transfers power 
among different types of interest groups.  Nonetheless, the evidence seems to clearly suggest that 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Effect of the Voter Initiative on the Value of State Governmental Offices: Evidence 





The resurgence of the use of the voter initiative process in U.S. states in the 1970’s and its 
continuously increasing role in the U.S. voting process has resulted in renewed interest in voter 
initiative research.  A significant proportion of the literature has been devoted to the debate 
concerning the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative process.   The focus of the debate 
centers largely on whether special interest groups or the median voter benefit most from the 
availability of the voter initiative.  While the state legislature is generally regarded as the loser in 
terms of relinquishing decision making authority when the voter initiative is available, there has 
been little investigation into the degree to which the decision making power of the state 
legislature is decreased (if in fact the state legislature sustains any loss in power).  Additionally, 
the impact on the decision making power of the state executive branch has been largely excluded 
from the discussion. 
 Matsusaka (2005c) explores the effects of the voter initiative on the relative power of the 
median voter, legislative branch, and executive branch in U.S. states.  He uses a simple model 
that employs single-peaked preferences to examine policy outcomes.  The model shows that the 
legislative branch does cede decision making power to voters when the voter initiative process is 
available.  However, there is no theoretical evidence to suggest that the legislature or the 
executive branch will gain power relative to one another.  While the voter initiative affords the 
governor the opportunity to bypass the legislature and propose laws through a direct vote, it also 
allows the general public to propose laws that can avoid the governor’s veto.  The theory does 
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not allow us to determine the exact impact of the voter initiative on the decision making power 
of the legislative branch or the executive branch. 
 The power of a politician lies in their ability to influence policy decisions.  While it is 
very difficult to measure the power of a political office, campaign spending can serve as a proxy 
measure.  While many factors (perhaps most importantly population) influence campaign 
spending, it is expected that candidates and their campaign contributors will spend more money 
to gain election to a more powerful position other things constant.  Palda (1992) finds that a 
higher degree of power induces increased spending in gubernatorial elections.   
 This paper evaluates the effect of the voter initiative on the power of the state legislative 
and executive branch by examining the amount of money that candidates spend in state elections.  
Total election cycle spending is estimated for state legislative elections based on an empirical 
specification by Hogan (2001).   An empirical specification by Lott, Jr. (2000) is used to estimate 
total election cycle spending by U.S. state candidates for gubernatorial seats.  It is expected that 
candidates will alter their spending accordingly if the availability of the voter initiative affects 
the power of an office.  If the voter initiative damages the power of the office, we would expect 
to see lower spending in voter initiative states other things constant. 
 Section II of this paper discusses the possible advantages and disadvantages that the state 
legislative branch and executive branch face with the availability of the voter initiative.  Section 
III examines campaign spending in U.S. state legislative elections and discusses the results for 
the U.S. legislature.  Section IV discusses expenditures in U.S. state gubernatorial elections and 
presents the results for the executive branch.  The effect of the voter initiative on the relative 
shift of power between the legislative branch and the executive branch is discussed in Section V.  
Section VI concludes. 
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4.2 The Effect of the Voter Initiative on Relative Power 
Much of the existing voter initiative literature has examined the beneficiaries of the voter 
initiative process and the corresponding loss in power sustained by the legislature.  Since the 
voter initiative allows voters to break the monopoly that the legislature holds on the creation of 
laws, it seems obvious that the legislature will in fact lose power relative to the voters when the 
voter initiative is available.  However, the extent of this loss has yet to be empirically 
investigated.  Additionally, the vast majority of the literature fails to account for the role of the 
executive branch in law making and ignores the effects of the voter initiative process on the 
executive branch in general. 
 Matsusaka (2005c) provides the first attempt to examine the effects of the voter initiative 
on the relative power of the median voter, the legislature, and the executive branch.  He uses a 
simple model similar to Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) in which all actors 
have single-peaked preferences.  The median voter’s ideal policy preference (V), the legislature’s 
ideal policy preferences (L), and the governor’s ideal policy preference (G) are points along the 
real line.  The policy (x) is a point on the real line.  A game between the three participants 
determines the equilibrium policy (x*) along the real line.    
 This model follows typical convention and ignores the idea that voters play a role in the 
law making process by electing their government officials.1  When this is the case, the median 
                                                 
1 While the legislature and the governor are elected by the voters, Matsusaka (2005) notes that the preferences of the 
median voter in the state may not coincide with the preferences of the legislature as a whole.  State legislators are 
elected in district elections and typically represent the median voter of the district.  Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001), 
Bradbury and Crain (2001), and Baqir (2002) discuss this issue.  
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voter and the governor are excluded from the law making process in the absence of the voter 
initiative.  In this case, the legislature is able to select their ideal policy preference (x* = L).2 
 However, the median voter and the governor can directly affect a policy decision when 
the voter initiative is available.  While there are several different scenarios and preference orders 
that may be considered, the evaluation of two potential situations displays the possible effects of 
the voter initiative on the relative power of the three players.  One possible situation is displayed 
in Figure 4.1(a).  In this case, L < V < G.  The availability of the voter initiative in this situation 
allows the voters or the governor to propose a policy that is better aligned with their preferences.  
If the status quo has been determined by the legislature (x* = L), the voters will favor a voter 
initiative placing the policy closer to their true preference.  This policy could be proposed by 
either the voters or the governor.3  The measure would be approved by voters if the voter 
initiative was placed on the ballot.  Additionally, the legislature might preemptively enact 
legislation that voters prefer to avoid a voter initiative that could push policy farther from the 
preferences of the legislature.4  When the situation in Figure 4.1 (a) exists, both voters and the 
governor stand to gain when the voter initiative process is available while the legislature loses 
power.  Any policy that prevails can benefit the voter and the governor.  At the very least, the 
voter initiative cannot harm either the voter or the governor in this situation.5  
 
                                                 
2 This simple model ignores gubernatorial veto power.  While the governors of all states except for North Carolina 
have some type of veto power, the passage of a voter initiative avoids the governor’s veto powers. 
3 Governors are able to propose voter initiatives due to their status.  Arnold Schwarzanegger is an excellent example 
of a governor who uses the voter initiative process to their advantage when possible.   
4 Gerber (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) find that the threat of a voter initiative can cause the state 
legislature to enact legislation to avoid a less favorable outcome through the voter initiative process.  Matsusaka 
(1995), Gerber and Hug (2001), and Arceneaux (2002) find that the indirect effect of the voter initiative has an 
impact on policy outcomes.  
5 The governor can still benefit in this situation with incomplete information (Gerber and Lupia, 1995 and McCarty 
(2001).  The voter can be harmed if incomplete information exists (Matsusaka, 2005c). 
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Figure 4.1: The Effect of the Voter Initiative on the Relative Power of the Legislative Branch, 








 However, a second scenario displayed in Figure 4.1 (b) can have different results.  In this 
case, V < L < G.  Once again, the availability of the voter initiative allows the voter the 
opportunity to choose a more ideal policy.   Assuming that the status quo policy is determined by 
the legislature (x* = L), voters will prefer a policy further to the left.  Once again, the proposition 
of a voter initiative may lead to preemptive action by the legislature.  If the voter initiative were 
to be placed on the ballot, voters would approve of the measure.  However, in this situation, the 
new policy is farther from the preferred policy of the governor.  Additionally, policies that are 
approved through voter initiatives are exempt from the governor’s veto.  While the legislature 
again loses power to the voter in Figure 4.1 (b), the governor can also be harmed by the policy 
resulting from the voter initiative process.  Finally, the voter should benefit from this situation 
and cannot be harmed at the very least. 
 According to this basic model, the voters are the one party that cannot be harmed by the 
presence of the voter initiative.  The legislature cannot gain power with the availability of the 
L V G 
(a) 
x 
L G V 
(b) 
x 
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voter initiative process because they would have a monopoly on the production of legislation 
otherwise.  The effect of the voter initiative on the executive branch remains rather ambiguous.  
The voter initiative can lead to a more favorable outcome for the governor when the policy 
preferences of the median voter are more aligned with the governor’s preferences than the 
preferences of the legislature, e.g. Figure 4.1 (a).  However, the voter initiative can lead to 
outcomes that are unfavorable to the governor when the preferences of the median voter are 
more aligned with those of the legislature, e.g. Figure 4.1 (b).   
 There are a few reasons to believe that the preferences of the median voter in U.S. states 
will be more aligned with the governor than the legislature.  Elections for the state legislature are 
held in different districts throughout the state.  Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001, 2004) find that the 
preferences of the median voter in the state will rarely correspond to the views of the state 
legislature, as the legislature will generally represent the median views of their districts.  
Bradbury and Crain (2001) and Baqir (2002) also imply that the views of the state legislature and 
the state median voter may not necessarily coincide.  However, the governor should tend to be 
more representative of the state median voter because the governor is chosen in a statewide 
election (Matsusaka, 2005c). 
 While theory and observation can guide our analysis of the effects of the voter initiative 
on the relative power of the median voter, the legislature, and the governor, the question has yet 
to be investigated empirically.  This paper attempts to examine this issue by estimating total 
election cycle spending by candidates for both state legislative and state gubernatorial offices.  
This affords the opportunity to examine the effects of the voter initiative on the power of the 
candidates through their own eyes.  If the availability of the voter initiative decreases the power 
of state legislators or state governors, we would expect to find that candidates in voter initiative 
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states spend less in election campaigns after controlling for other factors.  The following sections 
provide separate analysis of both state legislative election cycle expenditures and state 
gubernatorial election cycle expenditures. 
 
4.3 State Legislative Election Cycle Spending 
In order to evaluate the effect of the voter initiative on the power of the state legislature, this 
paper will estimate per capita total election cycle spending.  Each observation consists of the 
aggregate spending for all candidates for a state legislative seat in a given district.  This measure 
is used in order to capture the full value of the office.  Candidates are aware of the availability of 
the voter initiative process in their state and should spend accordingly if the voter initiative does 
affect the power of the legislature.  If the voter initiative does in fact reduce the power of the 
legislature, campaign expenditures are expected to be lower in states where the voter initiative is 
available.  This analysis controls for population in the independent variable because of the 
existence of a large variation in spending according to district population.  Gierzynski and 
Breaux (1991) and Hogan and Hamm (1998) note that population is in fact one of the most 
important explanatory factors in legislative campaign spending.   
 Several previous studies have examined state legislative election spending.  Moncrief 
(1992, 1998) and Hogan (2000) examine state legislative campaign spending at the candidate-
level.  Hogan and Hamm (1998) and Hogan (1999) investigate state legislative campaign 
spending at the district-level.  This paper investigates candidate spending aggregated by district 
and employs a specification similar to those mentioned above.  However, this study solely 
examines open seat elections in order to eliminate the wide variation in spending that occurs 
when an incumbent is involved in the election.  Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Moncrief 
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(1998) show that incumbents outspend their opponents on a regular basis.  Additionally, 
Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994) find that incumbents spend money on additional factors that are 
not directly related to the election campaign.  The exclusion of elections in which an incumbent 
is present also excludes the need to account for any type of leadership position or other 
significant status that an incumbent may obtain in the legislature.  These types of incumbents 
will often benefit from the ability to raise more money because of their status. 
 In order to estimate the per capita total election cycle spending in open seat elections for 
state legislative seats, this study includes several independent variables specific to the district and 
the state in which the election took place.  The number of candidates is included as a control 
variable to account for some of the competition in the election.  It is expected that a race with 
more candidates would involve higher campaign spending other things constant.  This can be the 
result of higher primary spending.  Breaux and Gierzynski (1991) find that primary spending can 
be quite high, particularly in states that are dominated by one party. 
 The other independent variables account for differences between states that may have an 
impact on campaign spending.  One important factor in campaign spending is the level of 
professionalism that exists in the state legislature (Squire, 1992; Hogan, 2000, 2001).  Members 
of a state legislature with a high degree of professionalism have more power to influence policy 
decisions.  Additionally, a higher level of professionalism also corresponds with higher salaries 
and other benefits.  Because the level of professionalism varies widely across states, it is 
expected that legislative professionalism will affect the amount of money that candidates are 
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willing to spend in order to become elected.  An index developed by Squire (1992) and expanded 
by King (2000) is used in order to measure legislative professionalism.6 
 Another essential key to the explanation of spending involves campaign finance 
regulations.  While the debate over the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations continues, 
little empirical evidence exists to support either side.7  Hogan (2000) shows that campaign 
finance regulations did in fact reduce campaign expenditures in state legislative elections in 
1994.  This study follows Hogan (2000) and categorizes states into three different groups based 
on the severity of finance laws in 2000.  Two dummy variables are used in order to evaluate the 
effect of the regulations.  The first variable consists of the states in which public funding is 
available to all candidates.  The second variable consists of states in which labor unions and 
corporations are not allowed to contribute to campaigns and political action committee donations 
are limited.  The excluded group consists of states in which there are little or no restrictions on 
campaign contributions8.  The campaign finance laws are expected to have the same effect on all 
elections included because only open seat elections are considered.9 
 Building on the previous literature, this analysis also performs a regression that includes 
state expenditures with the other explanatory variables.  Legislators in states that have high 
levels of expenditure effectively control more resources than legislators in states with smaller 
                                                 
6 Squire (1992) constructs a state index of legislative professionalism based on the length of the legislative session, 
the salary of legislators, and the staff size.  King (2000) updates the index to account for other legislative 
expenditures. 
7 While the intuitive expectation is that campaign finance laws will restrict campaign spending, studies such as 
Alexander (1991) argue that laws will do little to curtail the amount of money that is spent in politics.  
8 The vast majority of states fall into the category in which corporation and unions cannot contribute to candidates 
and the contributions of PACs are limited.  California, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia 
are coded as states with virtually no restrictions.  Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are the only states classified as 
public funding states because the public funding laws in the states apply to a large number of elections.  As 
explained in Malbin and Gais (1998), Hawaii is not coded as a public funding state because very little candidates 
ever receive funds. 
9 It is expected that contribution would limit spending for all types of candidates.  However, public financing may 
actually increase the spending of challengers while decreasing the spending of incumbents.  Campaign finance 
should affect all candidates in the same fashion in this examination as the analysis focuses on open seat elections. 
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expenditures.  Due to this, it seems reasonable to assume that candidates would be willing to 
spend more to gain control of legislative seats in the states with higher expenditures.  Lott, Jr. 
(2000) finds that higher state expenditures result in higher campaign expenditures in both state 
gubernatorial elections and state senate and house elections. 
 In order to examine the effect of the voter initiative on campaign spending, a dummy 
variable is included for voter initiative states.  States in which the voter initiative process is 
unavailable are the excluded group.10  States in which the voter initiative process is available 
differ in the amount of signatures that are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot.11  
This is accounted for by the inclusion of a signature requirement variable.  The percentage 
signature requirement is included for states with the voter initiative while states that lack the 
availability of the voter initiative process receive a value of zero.12  Year dummy variables are 
included to account for time fixed effects. 
 The data for the dependent variable in this analysis consists of the total election cycle 
spending in state legislative elections for every open seat for the year 2000.  This was obtained 
through the National Institute on Money in State Politics.  The data sources are listed in the 
appendix.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1.  The results are presented in Table 4.2.  
Column (a) shows the results of the standard independent variables with the voter initiative  
 
 
                                                 
10 Wyoming is not included as a voter initiative state because it has an extremely high signature requirement at 15%.  
Illinois is not included as a voter initiative state because it is the only state in which a proposal can only be used to 
alter the organization of the state legislature.  This follows the logic of Matsusaka (2004).  The inclusion of 
Wyoming and Illinois does not significantly alter the results. 
11 24 states have a form of the voter initiative at the state level.  The signature requirement varies from a low of 3% 
to a high of 15% (Initiative and Referendum Institute).  This difference in signature requirements results in 
substantial differences in the effects of the voter initiative process.  It can be very difficult to collect the signatures 
required for states with high signature requirements.   
12 The signature requirement variable follows Matsusaka (2004). 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Legislative Spending Regression 
 






State District Election Cycle 
Legislative Spending Per Capita 
$2.00 $2.25 $33.22 $0.002 
Per Capita State Expenditures $3992.03 $1150.56 $10,543.86 $2,828.68 
State District Population 70,683 104,119 846,792 7,870 
There are 689 observations for per capita state district election cycle legislative spending from the 2000 election 




variable included while (b) displays the inclusion of the signature requirement.  Columns (c) and 
(d) follow suit but include per capita state expenditures as an independent variable.   
 The results suggest that the availability of the voter initiative does have a significant 
impact on campaign spending in all cases.  Total per capita state district legislator election cycle 
spending is approximately $0.60 cents less in column (a) and $0.52 cents less in column (c) 
when per capita state expenditures are included.  The availability of the voter initiative does in 
fact seem to weaken the power of the state legislature. 
 The signature requirement affects the operation of the voter initiative process.  Because it 
is more difficult to collect a higher number of signatures, it is expected that the use and the threat 
of the voter initiative would be stronger in states in which the signature requirement is lower.  
The results in columns (b) and (d) of Table 2 show that this is in fact the case.  As the signature 
requirement rises, the negative impact of the voter initiative on campaign spending decreases.  
An F-test was performed and confirmed the joint significance between the voter initiative 
dummy variable and the signature requirement variable.  This signifies that legislators view the 
voter initiative as more of a threat when the signature requirement is lower.   
  The other independent variables are also of interest.  As expected, a higher number of 
candidates, a higher degree of legislative professionalism, and higher per capita state  
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Table 4.2: Total State District Legislator Election Cycle Spending Per Capita 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates (standard errors in parenthesis) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 








Signature Requirement - - - 0.1413*** 
(0.0520) 
- - - 0.0978* 
(0.0514) 


































Per Capita State 
Expenditures (thousands) 




Constant 1.1414 1.1587 -0.4998 -0.4093 
     
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1020 0.1103 0.1458 0.1491 
Note:  Dependent variable is per capita state district legislative election cycle spending for open seat elections for the year 2000.  
Standard errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 689 observations.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 




expenditures lead to higher levels of campaign spending.  The existence of contribution limits 
and the availability of public funding decrease campaign spending significantly in all regressions 
with the exception of column (a). 
 
4.4 State Gubernatorial Election Cycle Spending 
As mentioned previously, the voter initiative has an ambiguous effect on the power of the 
executive branch.  Total per capita election cycle gubernatorial expenditures are estimated in 
order to examine the issue.  Higher campaign spending in states in which the voter initiative is 
available would suggest that the governor gains power from the voter initiative process.  On the 
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other hand, lower spending would imply that the voter initiative process decreases executive 
branch power.   
 In order to estimate total election cycle spending, this analysis follows a model of 
campaign expenditure estimates from Lott, Jr. (2000).  The study accounts for a number of state 
specific and election specific factors in order to determine campaign spending.  As with the 
legislative campaign spending estimation, the dependent variable will account for state 
population by examining gubernatorial campaign spending on a per capita basis.  State 
population accounts for a great deal of the differences in spending between states. 
 Lott, Jr. (2000) employs two specifications in his estimation.  The first specification 
addresses basic independent election specific variables while the second specification examines 
differences in elections in greater detail.  Per capita state expenditures are the most important 
determinant of campaign spending according to Lott, Jr.  He argues that this is due to the fact 
state expenditures are the resources that candidates are vying to control.  Per capita income and 
population are also included as candidates are expected to have a greater desire to control richer 
and larger states.  A dummy variable is included to account for states that have split control of 
the state legislature.  It is possible that prospective governors may prefer unified legislatures that 
are aligned with their political preferences. 
 Two variables involving the term of the governor are included to account for variability 
across states.  A dummy variable for the maximum number of years that the governor is allowed 
to serve is included.13  It is expected that a position in which candidates can serve for a longer 
period of time would be more valuable due to the increase in power that the candidate may enjoy 
                                                 
13 35 states limit the governor to a maximum of two consecutive terms, 14 states do not have a term limit for the 
governor, and Virginia does not allow the governor to serve consecutive terms (The Book of the States). 
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from spending time in office.  Another dummy variable is included to account for the length of 
term that the governor serves.14   
 In the first specification, two variables are included to account for the conditions of the 
election.  The existence of an incumbent in an election can have a drastic effect on the level of 
spending, given the clear advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers.15  Higher spending 
is expected in open seat elections because none of the candidates have the advantage of name 
recognition and support.  A variable is also included to account for the number of candidates 
involved in the election.  Candidates are expected to spend more when there are more 
challengers.   
 The second specification includes more variables to account for differences in the 
elections.  A variable is included to account for incumbents and number of candidates in the 
election as mentioned previously.  It is also expected that closer races will involve higher levels 
of spending.  Candidates will generally spend less if they perceive that they will win or lose by a 
large margin.  This is measured with the post-election winning margin.16  The three 
aforementioned variables are included for the general election, the republican primary, and the 
democratic primary. 
 Variables are also included to account for the lack of a challenger in both the republican 
and democratic primary elections.  Candidates are expected to spend less when they do not have 
to compete in a primary election.  The percentage differences between the number of republicans 
and democrats in both the state senate and house are included.  Prospective governors may be 
                                                 
14 Governors currently serve four year terms in all states except New Hampshire and Vermont.  Arkansas had a two 
year term until 1986 and Rhode Island had a two year term until 1994 (The Book of the States). 
15 Incumbents enjoy recognition and status benefits over challengers, allowing them access to greater finances.  
Open seat candidates are also well financed as they have a greater chance to win than challengers.  Gierzynski and 
Breaux (1991) and Moncrief (1998) and other studies show that incumbents and open seat candidates spend more in 
elections in comparison to challengers. 
16 Candidates generally have an idea of the closeness of the election and spend accordingly.  This follows Muth’s 
(1961) rational expectations and is used in Kirchgässner and Meyer Zu Himmern (1997). 
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willing to spend more when the state legislature is more politically weighted in their favor.  
Finally, in order to assess the effect of the voter initiative, variables are included for voter 
initiative states and signature requirement as discussed in the previous section.  Year dummy 
variables are included to account for time fixed effects. 
 The data sources are listed in the appendix.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 
4.3.  The results are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  Table 4.4 displays the results for the two 
specifications with the inclusion of the dummy variable for voter initiative states.  Table 4.5 
shows the results when the signature requirement is also included. 
 The results in Table 4.4 indicate that the availability of the voter initiative process does in 
fact decrease spending in gubernatorial contests in both specifications by about forty-seven and 
fifty cents in columns (a) and (b) respectively.17  This implies that the availability of the voter 
initiative weakens the executive branch as well.  While the voter initiative does help the governor 
to sidestep the legislature in some instances, it seems that the ability of the voter initiative to 
avoid the governor’s veto power more than offsets any other benefits. 
 Table 4.5 displays the results of the analysis with the signature requirement.  While the 
voter initiative variable is negative, it is no longer significant.  An F-Test confirms that the voter 
initiative variable and the signature requirement variable are jointly insignificant.  This may be 
explained by the dual nature of the effects of the voter initiative on the executive branch.  While 
the analysis implies that the availability of the voter initiative decreases the power of the 
executive branch overall, it does benefit the executive branch under certain circumstances.  The 
benefits to the executive branch may occur at different levels of the signature requirement, which  
                                                 
17 While the legislative estimates investigated solely open seat elections, the analysis of gubernatorial elections 
includes incumbent elections as well.  This is due to the limited number of observations of gubernatorial elections.  
However, the regression analysis for gubernatorial spending was performed excluding elections in which an 
incumbent was present.  The primary results of the analysis did not change. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Gubernatorial Spending Regressions 
 






Total Election Cycle Gubernatorial 
Expenditures Per Capita 
$2.94 
 
$2.54 $21.12 $0.21 
Per Capita State Expenditures $3,267.91 $1,379.75 $13,127.35 $1,587.89 
Per Capita State Income $22,930.01 $4,296.47 $39,720.10 $13,955.81 
State Population (thousands) 4,677 5,280 32,988 446 
There are 304 total per capita election cycle gubernatorial expenditures observations from 1980 - 2002.  Per capita state 




could account for the joint insignificance of the voter initiative and signature requirement 
variables. 
 Additionally, the analysis suggests that the primary determinants of gubernatorial 
spending are per capita state expenditures and the closeness of the election.  Higher expenditures 
and closer elections lead to higher spending as expected.  The number of years that a governor 
can serve consecutively also plays a role, with governors being more willing to spend when they 
can serve longer.  The number of challengers and the existence of incumbents, while important 
in the first specification, do not seem to affect spending when the closeness of the election is 
included. 
 
4.5 Comparison of the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch 
The analysis thus far suggests that both the legislative branch and the executive branch lose 
power when the voter initiative is available.  However, the question of the relative shift of power 
between the two branches of government remains unanswered.  As mentioned previously, 
Matsusaka (2005c) provides rationale that the voter initiative may benefit state governors at the 
expense of the state legislature. 
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Table 4.4: Total Election Cycle Gubernatorial Expenditures Per Capita 
 Coefficient Estimates (standard errors in parenthesis) 
 (a) (b) 






























No Incumbent 0.9920 *** 
(0.2553) 
- - - 
Total Number of Candidates 0.3020 *** 
(0.0776) 
- - - 
Percent Difference Senate - - - -0.0104 
(0.0090) 
Percent Difference House - - - 0.0215 
(0.0089) 
General Incumbent - - - -0.6356 
(0.4098) 
General # of Candidates - - - -0.0336 
(0.3169) 
General Winning Margin - - - -0.0295 *** 
(0.0098) 
Republican Incumbent - - - 0.1237 
(0.4569) 
No Republican Challenger - - - 1.0515 ** 
(0.4647) 
Republican # of Candidates - - - 0.2032 
(0.1608) 
Republican Winning Margin - - - -0.0156 *** 
(0.0058) 
Democratic Incumbent - - - -0.1307 
(0.4462) 
No Democratic Challenger - - - 0.1136 
(0.4474) 
Democratic # of Candidates - - - 0.0340 
(0.1828) 
Democratic Winning Margin - - - -0.0120 ** 
(0.0418) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.4401 0.4913 
Note:  Dependent variable is per capita state election cycle spending by all gubernatorial candidates for 1980 – 2002.  Standard 
errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 304 observations for specification (a) and 298 observations for specification (b) due to 
missing data.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  Year dummy variables are not reported. 
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Table 4.5: Total Election Cycle Gubernatorial Expenditures Per Capita 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates (standard errors in parenthesis) 
 (a) (b) 
































No Incumbent 0.9960 *** 
(0.2568) 
- - - 
Total Number of Candidates 0.3000 *** 
(0.0785) 
- - - 
Percent Difference Senate - - - -0.0103 
(0.0090) 
Percent Difference House - - - 0.0214 ** 
(0.0089) 
General Incumbent - - - -0.6351 
(0.4106) 
General # of Candidates - - - -0.0548 
(0.3317) 
General Winning Margin - - - -0.0294 *** 
(0.0098) 
Republican Incumbent - - - 0.1139 
(0.4599) 
No Republican Challenger - - - 1.0620 ** 
(0.4680) 
Republican # of Candidates - - - 0.2036 
(0.1612) 
Republican Winning Margin - - - -0.0155 *** 
(0.0058) 
Democratic Incumbent - - - -0.1334 
(0.4472) 
No Democratic Challenger - - - 0.1189 
(0.4489) 
Democratic # of Candidates - - - 0.0331 
(0.1832) 
Democratic Winning Margin - - - -0.1210 ** 
(0.0059) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.4381 0.4894 
Note:  Dependent variable is per capita state election cycle spending by all gubernatorial candidates for 1980 – 2002.  Standard 
errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 304 observations for specification (a) and 298 observations for specification (b) due to 
missing data.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  Year dummy variables are not reported. 
  61 
 A rough comparison of the effects of the voter initiative on the two branches can be 
calculated from the results of the analysis in this paper.  While the availability of the voter 
initiative decreases spending in both elections, there is a relatively larger percentage decrease in 
state legislative spending in comparison to state gubernatorial spending.  The average per capita 
spending for state legislative elections is $2.00 in Table 4.1.  The voter initiative decreases 
spending in legislative elections by about $0.52 in Table 4.2 (c).  Spending in state legislative 
elections is reduced by approximately 26%.  The average per capita spending for state 
gubernatorial spending is $2.94 in Table 4.3.  Spending is reduced by about $0.50 in Table 4.4 
(b).  The availability of the voter initiative results in a 17% decrease in spending for 
gubernatorial candidates. 
  This analysis certainly does not completely explain the impact of the voter initiative on 
the relative power between the legislative and executive branches of the government.  However, 
the results are aligned with the rationale presented in Matsusaka (2005c).  The availability of the 
voter initiative has a relatively larger impact on campaign spending for state legislature elections 
in comparison to state gubernatorial elections.  This suggests that the power of the state 
legislature is reduced to a greater degree. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of the voter initiative on per capita election cycle campaign 
spending in state legislative and gubernatorial elections.  The analysis shows that campaign 
spending is significantly reduced in both state legislative and executive elections when the voter 
initiative is available.   Candidates for state legislative and state gubernatorial office are less 
willing to spend in order to gain election in states where the voter initiative is available.  This 
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implies that the voter initiative has a negative impact on the power of both of these branches of 
the government. 
 Additionally, the impact of the voter initiative on the relative power of the legislative 
branch and the executive branch is examined.  Spending is reduced by 26% on average in 
legislative elections in comparison to a 17% average reduction in spending in gubernatorial 
elections.  While not an exact measure, it does align with the theoretical rationale in Matsusaka 
(2005c).  It seems more likely that state governors will be more aligned with the state median 
voter, which should tip the relative balance of power in favor of the state executive branch 
relative to the legislative branch when the voter initiative is available.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Measuring the Indirect Effect: Voter Initiatives and Legislative Production in U.S. States 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The voter initiative is available in some form at the state level in 24 states in the U.S.  The 
availability of the voter initiative process allows citizens to circumvent the legislature in the 
proposal and passage of legislation.  Policy changes occur when a voter initiative is approved 
and cannot be vetoed by the governor.  Previous studies such as Bowler and Donovan (1998) and 
Matsusaka (2004) indicate that voter initiatives have a large impact on state policy outcomes.  
Voter initiatives seem to be playing an increasing role in the shaping of public policy.  In 2006, 
79 voter initiatives appeared on state ballots across the nation and 32 of the voter initiatives were 
approved by voters.  This was the third largest number of voter initiatives to appear in state 
elections since the first usage of the process in 1902 (Initiative and Referendum Institute).   
 The passage of legislation through voter initiatives that are placed on ballots is known as 
the direct effect of the voter initiative.  However, the voter initiative process can affect policy 
outcomes indirectly as well.  The threat of a voter initiative can influence the state legislature to 
enact legislation in order to avoid the passage of a voter initiative.  This allows the state 
legislature to maintain control over the policy outcome.  While the policy may not be aligned 
with the interests of the state legislature, it may avoid a less favorable outcome that could be 
enacted through the passage of a voter initiative.  Gerber (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka and 
McCarty (2001) discuss the indirect effect of the voter initiative.  Matsusaka (1995), Gerber 
(1996, 1999), and Arceneaux (2002) find that the indirect effect of the voter initiative does in 
fact influence policy outcomes in U.S. States. 
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 However, there are other possible indirect effects of the voter initiative process.  Magleby 
(1984) and Cronin (1989) argue that the voter initiative process may allow legislators to shirk 
and avoid taking decisive action on controversial decisions.  In these cases, the passage of a 
voter initiative could act as a substitute for activity in the state legislature.  
 While previous research has examined the theory and some specific outcomes involving 
the indirect effect of the voter initiative, the overall impact of the indirect effect on the state 
legislature has yet to be determined.  This paper examines several issues in order to examine the 
overall effect of the voter initiative on the production of legislation by the state legislature in 
U.S. states.  First the number of bills passed in U.S. states is estimated following a specification 
by Rogers (2004).  If the primary indirect effect of the voter initiative is to cause the state 
legislature to take preemptive action, we would expect that states in which the voter initiative 
process is available will enact more legislation controlling for other factors.  The number of 
special sessions called by U.S. states is also examined.  States call special sessions in order to 
deal with numerous issues.  If voter initiative states call special sessions more frequently than 
states in which the voter initiative is unavailable, evidence would be provided to support the 
notion that state legislatures become more active in the presence of the voter initiative.  Finally, 
the number of gubernatorial vetoes is estimated for U.S. states.  This allows us to examine how 
the governor reacts to the indirect effect of the voter initiative on legislation in U.S. states. 
 Section II of this paper discusses the theory behind the indirect effect of the voter 
initiative.  Section III examines legislative production in U.S. states and discusses the results for 
the estimation of the number of bills enacted.  Section IV analyzes the situations that result in the 
formation of a special session in U.S. state legislatures.  Section V discusses the estimation of 
the governor’s usage of veto power.  Section VI concludes. 
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5.2 The Indirect Effect of the Voter Initiative 
Gerber and Hug (2001) provide a thorough discussion of both the direct and indirect effects of 
the voter initiative.  The direct effects of the voter initiative occur when the voters approve of a 
voter initiative that has been placed on the ballot.  When this is the case, voters immediately and 
directly affect policy outcomes.  These direct effects of the voter initiative are relatively easy to 
observe.1  However, the indirect effects of the voter initiative are not necessarily as simple to 
recognize.  They require some additional discussion in order to identify how they may affect 
policy outcomes.   
 Gerber (1996, 1999) discusses the details of the decision making process of the 
legislature when faced with the possibility of a voter initiative.  Legislatures in states in which 
the voter initiative is available must consider that any legislation that they enact could be 
challenged with a voter initiative.  Additionally, various groups may propose a voter initiative in 
an attempt to achieve their policy goals.  If these voter initiatives are successful, they could lead 
to the adoption of policies that contrast with the preferences of the legislature.  Therefore, 
legislators may preemptively enact legislation in anticipation of a potential voter initiative that 
could lead to an adverse outcome.  Gerber (1996) models the behavior of the legislature in a 
sequential game in which there are three players: the legislature, a group that proposes a voter 
initiative, and the voter.  The objective of each of the players is to select the policy that results in 
the highest utility level. 
 The legislature is the first player to act and must decide if they should enact legislation to 
avoid a voter initiative.  The proposing groups then decide whether they should propose a voter 
                                                 
1 It is possible that some voter initiatives that are enacted through the ballot would have been enacted by the 
legislature in the absence of the voter initiative process (Gerber and Hug 2001). 
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initiative.  The game ends if the proposing group does not propose a voter initiative.  These 
actions must take place before the election.  Finally, if a voter initiative is placed on the ballot, 
the voter must decide between the policy that has been enacted by the legislature and the policy 
proposed in the voter initiative.  Gerber assumes that all players have a specific policy 
preference.2  All players in the model also have access to complete information.3  The 
preferences for each player, costs for each player, and the contents of all policies are know by all 
of the agents.  The policy space is restricted as one dimensional.4  There are some additional 
restrictions that are placed on the agents of the game.  The legislature is considered as a unitary 
actor.5  Their ideal policy preference is considered to be the policy that they would choose absent 
the possibility of the voter initiative.  The proposing group is also considered to be a unitary 
actor.6  The preferences of the voter are required to be fixed and known to all actors.  Finally, the 
legislature and the voter do not incur costs in the model.7  The proposing group does incur rather 
large costs.  They must devote a significant amount of resources in order to place a voter 
initiative on the ballot.    
 The game is solved using backward induction.  The voter chooses between the policy 
proposed by the group and the current policy of the legislature.  The option that delivers the 
                                                 
2 Gerber (1996) defines the preferences with a utility function and an ideal policy point.  Utility functions are 
restricted as monotonically decreasing from the player’s ideal policy point. 
3 The complete information restriction allows the investigation of the decisions of the agents in the model.  In reality 
the actors may not have all of the relevant information available to make a decision.  However, the introduction of 
imperfect information would not allow the understanding of the intuition in the model (Gerber 1996). 
4 A one dimensional policy space is logical in this situation because voter initiatives are restricted to a single issue 
and voters have only two choices (yes or no). 
5 While there may be disagreement between individual legislators, the legislative bodies, or the branches of the 
government, the groups would choose a policy point in the absence of the voter initiative (Gerber 1996).  This 
assumption allows for the examination of the relationship between the three agents in the model. 
6 It is possible for several competing groups to propose different or even conflicting policies.  However, over time 
the groups tend to split into two groups: one that supports the voter initiative and one that opposes the voter 
initiative.  
7 While the legislature may incur an opportunity cost of examining one issue over another, they have already 
decided to evaluate the issue when this model begins.  Voter behavior is considered to be costless for simplicity 
(Gerber 1996). 
  67 
greatest utility is chosen by the voter.  The proposing group encounters a more difficult decision.  
It would only be reasonable to propose a voter initiative if the benefits of the voter initiative 
outweighed the benefits of the current policy in addition to the costs of proposing the voter 
initiative.  Additionally, the voter initiative will only be proposed if the group is certain that the 
voters will approve of the proposed policy.  The proposing group will only support a voter 
initiative if both of the aforementioned conditions exist.  If the group decides to propose a voter 
initiative, they will propose the policy that results in their highest utility.  Finally, the legislature 
is left with a rather simple decision.  They will enact legislation in order to avoid a voter 
initiative if the proposing group chooses to propose a policy that is less desirable than the policy 
that the legislators can enact.  Otherwise the legislature will not take action. 
 The model provides the framework in which the legislature makes decisions when the 
voter initiative is available.  In the end, the legislature will enact legislation if it provides a 
greater benefit (or less of a loss in utility) than the possible voter initiative.  However, there may 
be other indirect effects of the voter initiative as well.  Magleby (1984) and Cronin (1989) argue 
that the voter initiative may allow the legislature to avoid making difficult decisions.  The 
legislature may choose inaction as opposed to making an unpopular decision that could hamper 
their reelection chances.  Legislators may allow the voters to decide the outcome of these 
decisions through a voter initiative.  This type of legislative inaction would lead to a reduction in 
the number of policy decisions made by the legislature. 
 While a number of recent empirical investigations have indicated that the presence of the 
voter initiative has significant policy effects, there is little evidence that directly attributes these 
effects to the indirect effect of the voter initiative.  Matsusaka (1995, 2004) finds that states in 
which the voter initiative is available have lower levels of spending and taxes, more user fees, 
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and more local spending in comparison to states in which the voter initiative process is 
unavailable.  Many of these policy effects occurred without the direct proposal of a voter 
initiative.  Gerber (1996, 1999) provides the most compelling evidence for the link between the 
indirect effects of the voter initiative and policy changes.  Gerber (1996) examines the issue of 
parental notification and consent for abortions in U.S. states.  The median voter’s preferences for 
the issue are estimated using survey data.  Gerber finds that states in which the voter initiative 
process is available are more likely to require parental notification of abortion in minors, which 
is preferred by a majority in opinion polls.  Arceneaux (2002) finds similar results using more 
recent survey data.  These provide excellent examples of the indirect effects of the voter 
initiative because policies are different in states in which the voter initiative is available even 
though the issue of parental notification and consent of abortions has not appeared as a voter 
initiative.  Gerber (1999) finds similar results for the death penalty in U.S. states.  Once again, 
the median voter’s preferences are estimated through survey data.  Voter initiative states are 
more likely to have policies that the median voter prefers although voter initiatives were not used 
to achieve the policy directly. 
 This study contributes to the literature by examining the overall indirect impact of the 
voter initiative on legislative production in U.S. states.  In theory, the voter initiative causes the 
legislature to produce more legislation in order to avoid unfavorable voter initiatives while 
possibly taking less action in order to avoid decisions on contentious issues.  The goal of this 
paper is to determine which of these effects is dominant (if the voter initiative does have a 
significant indirect effect).  This is done by estimating the number of bills enacted and the 
number of special sessions called by state legislators.  The usage of the governor’s veto is also 
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examined in order to determine how the indirect effect of the voter initiative affects the 
governor. 
 
5.3 Measuring Legislative Production 
In order to assess the impact of the voter initiative on the production of legislation in U.S. states, 
this section of the paper specifies an empirical estimation of the number of bills enacted by U.S. 
state legislatures.  Studies in the past have examined the production of legislation primarily in 
order to examine the impact of divided government.  The vast majority of the research in the area 
focuses on the federal government.  Mayhew (1991), Kelly (1993), and Howell, Adler, Cameron, 
and Rieman (2000) examine the production of legislative at the national level.  The studies 
examine legislation of different levels of significance (in an attempt to include only important 
legislation).  Rogers (2004) also estimates legislative production in order to examine the issue of 
divided government.  This study does not limit the analysis to significant legislation.8  
 This estimation generally follows the empirical specification of Rogers (2004).  
However, Rogers examines state legislation that has been enacted from the chamber in which it 
originated.  This study will examine the number of bills enacted at the U.S. state level.9  A 
number of variables are included to account for differences in both states and state legislative 
processes.  The log of population is included as a proxy of the demand for legislation.  The 
length of the legislative session varies across states and tends to have a large impact on the 
number of bills that are enacted in the session.  A variable that measures the actual number of 
                                                 
8 Rogers argues that several minor laws may combine to have a significant impact on policy.  Additionally, the task 
of qualifying legislation as significant is difficult and subjective. 
9 The dependent variable in Rogers (2004) is the number of bills enacted by a state legislature by chamber of 
origination.  This is done in order to assess the differences between divided branch government and divided party 
government.  Data on the chamber of origin is not available for many states.  The primary objective of this paper is 
to examine the effects of the voter initiative.  This requires the analysis of both voter initiative and non-initiative 
states.   For this reason, this study examines the number of bills enacted at the state level. 
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legislative business days in a session is included.  It is expected that large population and longer 
legislative sessions result in greater legislative production.  There are two clauses that some 
states employ in an attempt to regulate legislation.  Some states have a single subject clause that 
limits each bill to one particular topic.10  Additionally, some states utilize an origination clause 
that requires all revenue bills to originate in the house chamber of the state legislature.11  Two 
dummy variables are used to control for these clauses.  States in which the clauses do not exist 
are the excluded group.  The revenue bill of origination clause should decrease legislative 
production.  However, the effect of the single subject clause is somewhat ambiguous.  While it 
may increase the number of bills enacted as larger bills must be separated into individual bills, 
the clause also decreases logrolling opportunities among legislators, which may decrease the 
number of bills enacted (Rogers 2002). 
 A dummy variable is included to account for sessions in which the legislature was 
divided.  This occurs when the house and senate of a state legislature consist of a majority of 
opposite political parties.  Divided branch government is included by incorporating a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the governor is the opposite political party of a unified 
legislature.  The expectation is that divided government would decrease the production of 
legislation.12  A final dummy variable accounts for the party of the governor in the state.  This 
tests if democratic governors allow more legislation to pass than republican governors.  The 
dummy variable takes a value of one if the state governor is a republican.  Legislator salary is 
also accounted for in the analysis.   
                                                 
10 41 states have a constitutional provision requiring a single subject for legislation. 
11 18 states have a constitutional provision requiring revenue bills to originate in the house. 
12 Rogers (2004) finds that divided legislative government significantly reduces legislative production while divided 
branch government does not have a significant effect. 
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 The remaining variables describe the specific state legislatures and are also adapted from 
Rogers (2004).  The logged percentage of republican legislators in both the state house and 
senate are included to examine the impact that republican legislators have on legislative 
production.13  Legislative turnover may affect legislative production.  The percentage of new 
legislators that join both the house and the senate from the previous year’s election are included.  
Legislators may gain information, skills, and relationships though their experiences in the 
legislature.  Therefore, it is expected that a higher percentage of new legislators will lead to less 
legislative production.  A greater number of legislators in both the state house and senate may 
lead to more legislative production (Rogers 2002).  The numbers of house and senate legislators 
are included to account for these possible effects.  Legislative staff may help to facilitate the 
production of legislation.  The average number of staff members available to house and senate 
legislators is included.  Finally, variables are included to account for the number of house 
standing committees, senate standing committees, and joint standing committees.  These are 
generally believed to generate legislative production.14 
 In order to examine the effect of the voter initiative on the number of bills enacted, a 
dummy variable is included.  States in which the voter initiative process is available receive a 
value of one while states that lack the voter initiative process are the excluded group.15  States in 
which the voter initiative process is available differ in the amount of signatures that are required 
                                                 
13 The percentage of republican legislators is logged in order to account for the possibility that an increasing number 
of republican legislators should have an increasing effect on legislative production.  The inclusion of the percentage 
of republicans does not alter results (Rogers 2004). 
14 Committees are thought to decrease the incentives to free ride (Crain and Tollison, 1982, Rogers, 2002), help 
legislators to gain specialized knowledge (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Krehbiel 1998), and assist legislators in 
achieving personal goals (Mayhew 1974). 
15 Wyoming is not included as a voter initiative state because it has an extremely high signature requirement at 15%.  
Illinois is not included as a voter initiative state because it is the only state in which a proposal can only be used to 
alter the organization of the state legislature.  This follows the logic of Matsusaka (2004).  The inclusion of 
Wyoming and Illinois does not significantly alter the results. 
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in order to place a voter initiative on the ballot.16  This is accounted for by the inclusion of a 
signature requirement variable.  The percentage signature requirement is included for states with 
the voter initiative while states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable receive a value 
of zero.17  Year dummy variables are included to account for time fixed effects. 
 The dependent variable is the number of bills enacted by U.S. states during the regular 
legislative session in odd years from 1981 – 2001.18  The data sources are listed in the appendix.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 5.1.  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 
5.2.  The analysis suggests that the availability of the voter initiative does have a significant 
impact on the production of legislation in U.S. states.  Column (a) of Table 5.2 shows that states 
with the voter initiative enact about 97 more bills per year than states that lack the voter initiative 
process.   
 The signature requirement affects the use of the voter initiative process.  It is expected 
that the use and threat of the voter initiative would be weaker when the signature requirement is 
higher because it is more difficult to acquire a larger number of signatures.  Column (a) of Table 
5.2 shows that the signature requirement does significantly affect the production of legislation.  
This primary result is robust to different model specifications.  The voter initiative has a larger 
impact on the number of bills enacted when the signature requirement is lower.  A lower 
signature requirement coincides with the passage of more legislation.  An F-test was performed 
and confirmed the joint significance between the voter initiative variable and the signature  
 
                                                 
16 24 states have a form of the voter initiative at the state level.  The signature requirement varies from a low of 3% 
to a high of 15% (Initiative and Referendum Institute).  This difference in signature requirements results in 
substantial differences in the effects of the voter initiative process.  It can be very difficult to collect the signatures 
required for states with high signature requirements.   
17 The signature requirement variable follows Matsusaka (2004). 
18 The Book of the States reported data for odd years only until 1999. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 






Number of Bills Enacted (per year) 484.42 352.76 3,068 34 
Gubernatorial Vetoes 24.92 49.72 465 0 
Number of Special Sessions 0.83 1.09 7 0 
State Population (in thousands) 5,101 5,513 34,533 416 
Session Length 79.71 58.18 731 372 
House Standing Committees 19.23 10.08 59 0 
Senate Standing Committees 14.83 6.56 38 0 
Joint Standing Committees 2.77 5.85 73 0 
House Legislators 111.30 55.20 40 400 
Senate Legislators 39.79 10.55 20 67 
House Staff 1.07 0.75 3 0 
Senate Staff 1.17 0.68 3 0 
Salary $22,870.87 $18,329.67 $99,000 0 
Number of Natural Disasters 0.61 0.84 5 0 
The data are for U.S. States from 1981 – 2001 (odd years only due to the data available in The Book of the States).  All monetary 




requirement variable.  This signals that state legislators are more responsive to the threat of the 
voter initiative when the signature requirement is lower. 
 The results suggest that the indirect effect of the voter initiative does in fact exist as states 
with the voter initiative enact more legislation.  Additionally, the number of bills that are enacted 
in response to the threat of a voter initiative seem to far outweigh any decrease in legislation that 
might occur when the legislature does not act on controversial decisions.  Some other 
independent variables are also of interest.  As expected, a higher population and a longer session 
length result in a significantly greater amount of legislation.  Additionally, single subject clauses 
for bills and revenue bill origination clauses significantly decrease the number of bills enacted. 
 
5.4 Special Sessions 
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Table 5.2: Number of Bills Enacted 
 
Coefficient Estimates (standard errors are in parenthesis) Independent Variable 
(a) (b) 




Signature Requirement - - - -40.36 *** 
(9.57) 

















































































Adjusted R-Squared 0.2630 0.2906 
Note:  Dependent variable is the number of bills enacted in U.S. States during the regular legislative session every other year 
from 1981 – 2001 (due to the information available in the Book of States).  Standard errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 
461 observations.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  Year dummy variables are not 
reported. 
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The majority of the legislative production in U.S. states occurs during the regular legislative 
session.  However, special sessions can be called when the legislative branch and the executive 
branch perceive urgent issues that require immediate action.  The National Conference of State 
Legislatures explains that these special sessions may be called for a number of reasons.  Court 
decisions, federal government actions, natural disasters, redistricting issues, and state economy 
issues can result in a special session.  Additionally, limitations on the length or scope of both 
regular and special sessions, legislative and executive party control, and the political culture of 
the state can also affect the decision to call a special session.  Other factors may influence a 
special session as well.  There are no limits on the number of special sessions that can be called 
in a given year.    
 Previous research (Matsusaka 1995, 2004; Gerber 1996, 1999; Arceneaux 2002) and the 
preceding section in this paper find that the indirect effect of the voter initiative does affect 
policy outcomes and the production of legislation.  This section examines the reasons that 
special sessions are called.  If the availability of the voter initiative causes the state legislature to 
enact legislation to avoid potentially unfavorable voter initiatives, it seems possible that more 
special sessions would be called in states in which the voter initiative is available.  Special 
sessions can be called for a wide variety of reasons.  The threat of the voter initiative may 
influence the legislature’s decision to call a special session.  Special sessions may be called 
explicitly to deal with the threat of a voter initiative.  However, it seems more likely that the 
threat of a voter initiative could serve as one of several reasons to call a special session.  The 
voter initiative could provide the additional incentive required for the legislature to approve of a 
special session. 
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 Unfortunately previous research does not provide an example that can guide the process 
of estimating state special sessions.  However, it is possible to control for some variables that 
could be responsible for special sessions.   It seems reasonable to assume that many of the 
variables that affect the production of legislation could also affect special sessions.  Population 
serves as a reasonable proxy for the demand of legislation.  The log of population is included in 
the specification.  The regular session length is also included.  When regular sessions are longer, 
state legislators should be able to address more issues.  Legislators may not have enough time to 
address important issues when the regular session is shorter.  This analysis will also control for 
states that have a single subject clause and a clause requiring revenue bills to originate in the 
house chamber.  While these seem to lead to a reduction in the number of bills passed in the 
regular session, it is difficult to asses the impact of these clauses on special sessions.  While they 
may lead to more special sessions because they seem to make it more difficult to pass legislation, 
they could reduce the number of sessions because legislators know that the clauses will affect 
their ability to enact legislation if they do call a special session. 
 Some states allow both the legislature and the governor to call special sessions while 
other states relegate decisions concerning special sessions to the governor.19  A dummy variable 
is included to account for the states in which the governor is solely responsible for special 
sessions.  Several states place limitations on the scope of legislature in the regular session.20  A 
dummy variable is also included to account for these states.  Divided legislature seems to have 
an ambiguous affect on the decision to call a special session.  A divided legislature could lead to 
a reduction in the number bills enacted in the regular session, leaving issues unresolved and 
                                                 
19 32 states allow both the legislature and the governor to call a special session while 18 states restrict decisions on 
special sessions to the discretion of the governor. 
20 Six states limit the scope of legislation every other year.  However, the majority of the limitations are so broad 
that they have little effect (National Conference of State Legislators).  
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requiring a special session.  However, divided legislatures may be less likely to agree to a special 
session because of political differences.  A dummy variable that takes the value of one for states 
with a divided legislature is included.  A variable is included to account for situations in which a 
unified legislature and an opposite party governor are involved.  This should result in less 
cooperation between the two branches and may lead to a reduction in the number of special 
sessions. 
 Some variables are included to account for the political environment of the state.  A 
dummy variable for republican governors is included to test if republican governors are less 
likely to call special sessions.  The logged percentage of republicans and the percentage turnover 
from the previous year for both the house and senate are included to account for politics in the 
legislature.  A variable is also included to check whether legislatures call more special sessions 
in order to deal with natural disasters.21  Finally, the impact of the voter initiative is examined 
with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the state has the voter initiative process 
available.  Once again, the data sources for this analysis are listed in the appendix. 
 The dependent variable is the number of special sessions called by a U.S. state in a 
calendar year.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.1.  The results are presented in 
Table 5.3.  The analysis indicates that the voter initiative has a positive and significant effect on 
the number of special sessions called in a given year.  This result is robust to different 
specifications of the model.  States in which the voter initiative process is available had about 
0.32 more special sessions from 1981 – 2001 than states in which the voter initiative process is 
unavailable. 
 The results in Table 5.3 display some other interesting results.  It seems that states with 
higher populations call more special sessions.  Longer regular legislative sessions lead to a  
                                                 
21 The numbers of natural disasters as declared by FEMA are used in the analysis. 
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Table 5.3: Number of Special Sessions in U.S. States 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Voter Initiative 0.3211 *** 
( .01053) 
Population (log) 0.1651 *** 
(0.0553) 
Session Length -0.0036 *** 
(0.0009) 
Bill Single Subject Clause 0.1502 
(0.1449) 
Revenue Bill Origination Clause -0.1525 
(0.1027) 
Legislative Scope Limits 0.0355 ** 
(0.1668) 
Gubernatorial Control of Special Sessions 0.1221 
(0.1054) 
Divided Legislature -0.0684 
(0.1363) 
Opposite Party Governor -0.0975 
(0.1151) 
Republican Governor -0.1082  
(0.1036) 
House Republicans (% log) 0.2938 
(0.1864) 
Senate Republicans (% log) -0.4480 *** 
(0.1627) 
House Turnover (%) 0.0188 *** 
(0.0062) 
Senate Turnover (%) 0.0077 
(0.0057) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.1897 
Note:  Dependent variable is the number of special sessions called in a calendar year in U.S. States during odd years from 1981 – 
2001 (due to the information available in the Book of States).  Standard errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 460 




reduction in the number of special sessions called.  The longer time could increase the 
legislator’s opportunity to resolve issues in the regular session.  Additionally state senates with a 
higher percentage of republicans are less likely to call a special session while a more junior 
house is slightly more likely to call a special session.  
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5.5 The Governor’s Veto 
Governors in 49 U.S. states possess some degree of veto power over the decisions that are made 
in the legislature.  The veto is enacted by the governor when the legislature attempts to pass a 
policy that the governor views as unfavorable.  Once again, the indirect effect of the voter 
initiative has been shown to significantly affect policy outcomes and legislative production 
(Matsusaka 1995, 2004; Gerber 1996, 1999; Arceneaux 2002).  This section examines the 
reaction of the state governors to the increased legislative production due to the threat of the 
voter initiative. 
 Previous research can provide some insight into this discussion.  Matsusaka (2004) and 
Gerber (1996, 1999) find that the voter initiative leads to policies that are preferred by the 
median voter.  There are some reasons to believe that the state governor and the median voter 
may favor similar policies (Matsusaka 2005c).  The governor is elected by a majority in a 
statewide election (Matsusaka 2005c).  On the other hand, the legislature is chosen through 
district level elections.  Previous studies find that the preferences of the state legislature may not 
be aligned with the median voter in the state (Gilligan and Matsusaka 2001, 2004; Bradbury and 
Crain 2001; Baqir 2002).  However, the threat of the voter initiative may cause the legislature to 
enact legislation that is more aligned with the preferences of the state median voter.  If the 
preferences of the governor are aligned with those of the state median voter, it seems reasonable 
to expect that the governor would prefer the legislation that occurs due to the indirect effect of 
the voter initiative.  Additionally, voter initiatives are not subject to the governor’s veto.  If 
legislation is enacted in order to prevent the proposal of a voter initiative, the governor may not 
veto the legislation because voters could enact the policy through a voter initiative.  Therefore, 
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the expectation is that governors will be less likely to veto legislation in states in which the voter 
initiative is available. 
 In order to evaluate this hypothesis, this paper estimates state gubernatorial vetoes from 
1981 – 2001.  Numerous studies have examined the impact of the gubernatorial veto (Abrams 
and Dougan 1986; Holtz-Eakin 1988; Carter and Shap 1990; Alm and Evers 1991).  They largely 
conclude that the immediate impact of the gubernatorial veto depends largely on the political 
parties of the governor and the legislature and the political climate in the state.  This empirical 
specification attempts to control for these issues.  Additionally, other variables are included to 
account for some of the differences between states.   
 The log of population is included to proxy the demand for legislation.  The number of 
bills serves as an indicator of the activity level of the state legislature.  It is expected that more 
bills will be vetoed when a legislature more actively attempts to pass legislation.  Session length 
is also included as governors may veto more bills when the legislature has more time to enact 
legislation.  Dummy variables are included to test the effects of states that have a single subject 
clause and a clause that requires a revenue bill to originate in the house chamber.   Dummy 
variables are also included to account for governors that face a unified opposite party legislature 
and governors that face a divided legislature.  The political party of the governor may affect the 
usage of the gubernatorial veto.  A variable is included to account for republican governors.  
Finally, the impact of the voter initiative is examined with a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one when the state has the voter initiative process available. 
 The dependent variable is the number of vetoes exercised by the state governor during 
the regular legislative session.  The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.1.  Data sources 
are reported in the appendix.  Results are presented in Table 5.4.  The availability of the voter  
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Table 5.4: Gubernatorial Vetoes in U.S. States 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates (standard errors in parenthesis) 
Voter Initiative -13.87 *** 
(4.05) 
Bills Enacted 0.0719 *** 
(0.0059) 
Population (log) 7.04 *** 
(2.16) 
Session Length 0.0545 
(0.0354) 
Bill Single Subject Clause 19.14 *** 
(5.46) 
Revenue Bill Origination Clause -15.32 *** 
(4.15) 
Divided Legislature -8.40 
(5.25) 
Opposite Party Governor 5.34 
(4.57) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.3551 
Note:  Dependent variable is the number of gubernatorial vetoes in the calendar year in U.S. States during odd years from 1981 – 
2001 (due to the information available in the Book of States).  Standard errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 460 




initiative has a negative and significant effect on the use of the gubernatorial veto.  This result is 
robust to different specifications of the model.  Governors in voter initiative states are less likely 
to wield veto power.  These results seem to agree with the original hypothesis.  The threat of the 
voter initiative can persuade the legislature to enact policies that are better aligned with the 
preferences of the median voter.  Since the preferences of the governor may be better aligned 
with the preferences of the median voter, the governor is less likely to veto legislation in states in 
which the voter initiative is available.  Additionally, the governor may not veto legislation that is 
the result of the indirect effect of the voter initiative because voters can enact the measure 
through the voter initiative process.  State governors cannot veto successful voter initiatives. 
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 The analysis reveals some other interesting results.  A larger number of bills and a larger 
population both lead to greater usage of the gubernatorial veto.  Single subject clauses for bills 
increase the number of vetoes enacted while clauses that require revenue bills to originate in the 
house chamber result in less usage of the gubernatorial veto.  Finally, Republican governors 
seem a bit more likely to veto legislation. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the voter initiative on legislative production in U.S. States.  In 
theory, the threat of the voter initiative can cause the state legislature to preemptively enact 
legislation in order to avoid an unfavorable outcome from the passage of a voter initiative 
(Gerber, 1996, 1999).  However, the voter initiative could also cause legislatures to avoid 
controversial decisions (Magleby 1984; Cronin 1989), leading to a decrease in the production of 
legislation.   
 The results in this paper show that the availability of the voter initiative leads to an 
increase in the production of legislation in U.S. states.  The threat of the voter initiative does 
have a significant impact on the state legislature.  Additionally, the signature requirement has 
significant effects on the behavior of the legislature in states where the voter initiative process is 
available.  State legislatures in voter initiative states are less responsive to the threat of a voter 
initiative when the signature requirement is high.  The number of bills enacted as the result of the 
indirect effect of the voter initiative declines as the signature requirement rises. 
 The paper also examines the number of special sessions that are called in U.S. states.  
The results conclude that states in which the voter initiative process is available are more likely 
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to call special sessions.  The threat of the voter initiative can persuade the legislatures in voter 
initiative states to call special sessions.   
 Finally, the use of the gubernatorial veto is examined for U.S. states.  Previous research 
has found that the voter initiative leads to policy outcomes that are favored by the median voter 
(Gerber 1996, 1999; Matsusaka 2004).  Additionally, the preferences of the governor are more 
likely to coincide with those of the median voter than those of the state legislature (Matsusaka 
2005c).  Therefore the governor may prefer the policies that are enacted due to the threat of the 
voter initiative.  Additionally, governors may not veto legislation that is the result of the indirect 
effect of the voter initiative because voters can enact a voter initiative directly.  Governors 
cannot veto a successful voter initiative.  The results conclude that governors are less likely to 
exercise their veto power when the voter initiative is available.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
As the voter initiative process has gained importance in the past few decades, scholars and 
journalists have responded with a renewed interest in the voter initiative process.  The primary 
question surrounding the voter initiative process in the modern era resembles the debate from 
early in the twentieth century.  Proponents of the voter initiative praise the voter initiative 
process as a method by which the voters can directly influence legislation and combat wealthy 
special interest group influence.  Opponents believe that rich special interest groups are the 
primary beneficiary of the voter initiative process.  Additionally, scholars have examined 
numerous other effects of the voter initiative process.  While previous research has provided a 
great deal of insight into the effects of the voter initiative process, many issues surrounding the 
voter initiative process have yet to be resolved.  This dissertation has addressed a few of these 
important issues. 
 The essays in this dissertation provide several important conclusions concerning the voter 
initiative process.  First, the existence of the voter initiative process does not decrease the effect 
of interest groups on government spending.  This seems reasonable as interest groups play a vital 
role in the voter initiative process.  Second, the availability of the voter initiative process 
decreases the power of the state legislative branch and the state executive branch.  Additional 
evidence suggests that the state legislative branch may sustain a greater loss in power relative to 
the state executive branch.  Third, the state legislature is more active in voter initiative states 
when compared to states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable.  The final two 
conclusions imply that politicians are forced to engage in legislative activities that they would 
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have otherwise avoided in the absence of the voter initiative process.  This could suggest that the 
availability of the voter initiative process may force the government to be more responsive to the 
preferences of the voters.   
While the previous literature has contributed greatly to our understanding of the effects of 
the voter initiative process, many aspects of the process require further investigation.  The 
relatively modest attention that the voter initiative process has received in comparison to the 
voting process in general has resulted in a number of important issues remaining unanswered.  
The remainder of this section discusses some of these issues. 
Twenty six states have the voter initiative process at the state level while the other twenty 
four states do not.  Research has yet to completely explain the rationale for the existence of the 
voter initiative in only half of the states in the U.S.  The vast majority of voter initiative states 
adopted the process in the beginning of the 20th century.  Previous inquiries including Hofstadter 
(1955), Cronin (1989), and McMath (1993) describe the progressive movement of the era but do 
not agree on a specific reason for the adoption of the voter initiative process.  Price (1975) argues 
that western states may have been able to gain access to the voter initiative process because their 
state political systems were new and less traditional than older states in the east. 
The usage of the voter initiative process in states has varied greatly over time.  This has 
also yet to be completely explained.  The voter initiative process was used to a great extent in the 
first few decades of the 20th century.  However, usage declined from the 1930’s to the 1960’s.  
Following California’s lead in 1978, the voter initiative process once again regained popularity.  
Speculation suggests that the Great Depression and World War II contributed to the decline in 
voter initiative use in the middle of the 20th century while technology drove the increase in voter 
initiative usage toward the end of the 20th century.  While these explanations offer a plausible 
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argument for the observed differences in the usage of the voter initiative process, further research 
may be able to identify other explanations as well.  It would be interesting to examine the 
correlation between public satisfaction with the political process (perhaps through political polls) 
and the usage of the voter initiative process. 
While recent literature has started to focus on the effects of the voter initiative process, a 
great deal of uncertainty continues to surround the transition between the time that a voter 
initiative is passed in an election and the implementation of the passed voter initiative.  The 
legislature ultimately must enact a voter initiative, but the effect of the voter initiative can be 
altered through the process of implementation and the passage of subsequent legislation.  Gerber, 
Lupia, McCubbins, and Kiewiet (2001) and Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins (2004) find that 
issues that are likely to be passed through the voter initiative process are less likely to be 
enforced than issues that are resolved by the state legislature.  This issue could be investigated 
further through the examination of the resulting laws that are enacted when a voter initiative is 
passed and the other laws that are enacted by the legislature at the time.  It would be also be 
interesting to examine the effects of the voter initiative process on the internal organization of 
the state legislature.  Legislators in voter initiative states must consider voter initiatives once they 
are approved on the ballot and the possibility of future voter initiatives.  The existence of the 
voter initiative process may lead to additional employees, committees, and meetings in order to 
address the issues.   
The effect of the voter initiative process on the rights of minorities has been an issue of 
contention for years.  While the adoption of a voter initiative will obviously result in the 
approval of a policy that the majority prefers while a minority does not, some issues may deprive 
the civil rights of a particular minority group of the population.  Several voter initiatives in the 
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past (including the violation of the civil rights of blacks and Japanese early in the 20th century) 
fall into the latter category.  The issue of gay marriage provides a more recent example of voter 
initiative topics that target minority groups.  While the possible trampling of minority rights has 
certainly been an issue in the democratic process in general, it deserves closer evaluation in the 
voter initiative process as the outcomes are determined directly by the voters.   
Exit poll data may provide another area that could assist in the understanding of the 
players in the voter initiative process.  Lupia (1994) used exit poll data to show that voters can 
use the interest groups who support and propose voter initiatives as information to help them to 
decide whether they personally support the voter initiative in question.  He found that voters who 
knew the stance of the interest groups behind the voter initiatives were able to vote their true 
preferences even if they did not know the specific details about the voter initiatives on the ballot.  
Exit poll data could be used in the future to attempt to gain a greater understanding of the effects 
of the voter initiative on the characteristics of the voters involved in the process.    
Another important future consideration involves the effects of the voter initiative process 
on the behavior of interest groups.  The voter initiative process affords interest groups an 
additional method to use in order to accomplish their goals.  Boehmke (2005) has found that this 
leads to more interest groups and more interest group activity in voter initiative states.  This 
leads to several interesting questions involving the interest groups in voter initiative states.  It 
would be informative to examine what happens to the interest groups that are formed in order to 
propose or fight a voter initiative through time.  These groups may form for one specific voter 
initiative and disband once the issue is settled.  On the other hand, a group may form for a 
specific voter initiative and then evolve into a group that fights for other issues.  Additionally, it 
would be interesting to examine the individuals involved in the interest group activity that is the 
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result of the voter initiative process.  The newly formed interest groups could simply be 
comprised of individuals in other interest groups that want to bring a specific issue to the 
forefront.  However, the voter initiative process could actually increase the number of 
individuals that are involved in interest groups.  Both of these issues could have a large impact 
on the nature of the political environment in voter initiative states.  Finally, it would be 
interesting to examine the spatial effects of the voter initiative process.  If an issue is proposed in 
a voter initiative state and interest groups are formed (or old groups become more active), the 
activity may spill over into neighboring states.  This activity may then take different forms 
depending on whether the neighboring state has the voter initiative process available. 
In the future, the voter initiative process will continue to be used for different purposes as 
technological progress continues and new issues are faced.  All current signs seem to suggest that 
direct democracy will continue to play a significant role in the political process in the future.  
Further research will be required in order build on our understanding of the voter initiative in the 
past and to help us understand the effects of the voter initiative in the years to come. 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 3: Data sources and variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Total State Government 
Expenditures ( S ) 
Total state expenditures in millions of dollars A 
Population ( N ) State population in thousands A 
Income ( *iY ) Median state income in dollars A 
Population Density ( DEN ) State population per square mile A 
Median Age ( AGE ) State median age B 
% Non-white ( NW ) State percentage of population non-white  A 
# Local Governments 
( LOCAL ) 
State number of municipal and county governments per 
square mile 
A 
Pop. Growth Rate ( CPOP ) Percent change in population from previous year A 
Initiative ( I ) = 1 for states with the voter initiative E 
Federal Grants ( F ) Federal grants to states in millions of dollars A 
 State general sales and income tax revenue in millions A 
 Average effective income and sales tax rate for 1980 C 
 Average effective income and sales tax rate for 1990 




 A: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., U.S. Census Bureau 
 B: Census of Population, U.S. Census Bureau 
 C: Feenberg and Rosen (1985) 
 D: National Center for Higher Education Management Systems 
 E: Matsusaka (2004) 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 4: Data sources and variable definitions. 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Legislative Dependent Variable Total state district legislator election cycle spending per capita A 
Voter Initiative = 1 if the voter initiative process is available in the state B 
Signature Requirement = percentage signature requirement B 
Number of Candidates Total number of candidates in legislative district election A 
Contribution Limits = 1 if labor unions and corporations are prohibited from contributing to 
legislative campaigns, PACs are limited 
C 
Public Funding = 1 if public funding is available to all state legislative candidates C 
Legislative Professionalism Index by Squire (1992) and King (2000) on a scale of 0 to 1 D 
Per Capita State Expenditures 
(thousands) 
State expenditures per capita for year E 
Gubernatorial Dependent 
Variable 
Total election cycle gubernatorial spending per capita F 
Per Capita Income (thousands) State income per capita in thousands ($2000) E 
Per Capita State Expenditures 
(thousands) 
State expenditures per capita in thousands ($2000) E 
Population State population E 
Split Control State Legislature = 1 if control of state legislative chambers is split by parties G 
Maximum Consecutive Years Maximum number of years governor can serve F 
Length of Term Term length of governor F 
No Incumbent = 1 if there was not incumbent in the gubernatorial election H 
Total Number of Candidates Total number of candidates in the gubernatorial election H 
Percent Difference Senate Percentage difference between republicans and democrats in the upper 
chamber 
G 
Percent Difference House Percentage difference between republicans and democrats in the lower 
chamber 
G 
General Incumbent = 1 if there is an incumbent in the gubernatorial general election H 
General # of Candidates Number of candidates in the gubernatorial general election H 
General Winning Margin Percentage winning margin in the gubernatorial general election H 
Republican Incumbent = 1 if there is an incumbent in the gubernatorial republican primary H 
No Republican Challenger = 1 if there is no challenger in the gubernatorial republican primary H 
Republican # of Candidates Number of candidates in the gubernatorial republican primary H 
Republican Wining Margin Percentage winning margin in the gubernatorial republican primary H 
Democratic Incumbent = 1 if there is an incumbent in the gubernatorial democratic primary H 
No Democratic Challenger = 1 if there is no challenger in the gubernatorial democratic primary H 
Democratic # of Candidates Number of candidates in the gubernatorial democratic primary H 
Democratic Wining Margin Percentage winning margin in the gubernatorial democratic primary H 
 
Sources: 
 A: The National Institute on Money in State Politics 
 B: Initiative and Referendum Institute 
 C: National Conference of State Legislators 
 D: Squire (1992) and King (2000) 
 E: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., U.S. Census Bureau 
 F: The Book of the States 
 G: World Almanac and Book of Facts 
 H: Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 5: Data sources and variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Number of Bills Enacted Number of bills enacted in U.S. state regular legislative 
session 
A 
Number of Special Sessions Number of special sessions called in U.S. states A 
Number of Gubernatorial 
Vetoes 
Number of gubernatorial vetoes U.S. state regular legislative 
session 
A 
Initiative = 1 for states in which the voter initiative is available B 
Signature Requirement = % signature requirement for initiative states B 
Population (log) Log of the population (in 1000’s) C 
Session Length Number of legislative work days in the regular session A 
Bill Single Subject Clause = 1 for states that restrict bills to a single subject D 
Revenue Bill Origination 
Clause 
= 1 for states in which revenue bills must originate in the 
house chamber 
D 
Divided Legislature = 1 for states in which legislative chambers have opposing 
majority parties 
A 
Opposite Party Governor = 1 for states in which a unified legislature face an opposite 
party governor 
A 
Republican Governor = 1 for states with a republican governor A 
House Republicans (% log) Log of the percentage of republicans in lower chamber A 
Senate Republicans (% log) Log of the percentage of republicans in upper chamber A 
House Turnover (%) Percentage newly elected legislator from previous years lower 
chamber election 
A 
Senate Turnover (%) Percentage newly elected legislator from previous years upper 
chamber election 
A 
House Standing Committees Number of standing committees in the lower chamber A 
Senate Standing Committees Number of standing committees in the upper chamber A 
Joint Standing Committees Number of joint standing committees  A 
Number of House Legislators Number of legislators in the lower chamber A 
Number of Senate Legislators Number of legislators in the upper chamber A 
House Staff Average staff allocated to lower chamber legislators A 
Senate Staff Average staff allocated to upper chamber legislators A 
Salary (thousands) State legislator salary in thousands A 
Legislative Scope Limits = 1 for states that limit the scope of legislative regular 
sessions 
D 
Gubernatorial Control of 
Special Sessions 
= 1 if only state governors have authority to call special 
sessions 
D 
Natural Disasters Number of natural disasters in state as defined by FEMA E 
 
Sources: 
 A: The Book of the States 
 B: Initiative and Referendum Institute 
 C: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., U.S. Census Bureau 
 D: National Conference of State Legislators 
 E: FEMA 
 
